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Resumo
A minha tese e´ composta por treˆs ensaios. No primeiro ensaio, eu sou o primeiro
a relacionar a sorte com a protec¸a˜o de emprego: eu estudo os efeitos da protec¸a˜o
de emprego na importaˆncia da sorte, me´rito e esforc¸o em determinar a desigual-
dade no rendimento. Para esse fim, eu desenvolvo um modelo com trabalhadores
e empresas hetero´geneas cuja interac¸a˜o esta´ sujeita a fricc¸o˜es de matching. No
modelo, um aumento da protec¸a˜o de emprego aumenta a importaˆncia da sorte e
diminui a importaˆncia do me´rito em gerar desigualdade do rendimento.
No segundo ensaio, eu e o Alper C¸enesiz, estudamos os efeitos de polı´tica
moneta´ria no produto agregado e produtos sectoriais. O modelo New Keynesian
tradicional com dois sectores (sectores de bens dura´veis e bens na˜o dura´veis)
gera co-movimento sectorial negativo e neutralidade da moeda ou falta de co-
movimento sectorial. Estes resultados va˜o contra o senso comum e a evideˆncia
de VAR: (i) os produtos agregados e sectoriais movem na mesma direc¸a˜o, e (ii) o
prec¸o e o produto do sector dura´vel reagem mais do que os do sector na˜o dura´vel.
Neste ensaio, no´s reconciliamos o modelo New Keynesian com a evideˆncia VAR
ao introduzir rigidez real nos sala´rios.
No terceiro ensaio, eu e o Alper C¸enesiz, foca´mo-nos no unemployment volatil-
ity puzzle. O modelo de search and matching tem um problema de volatilidade:
o desvio padra˜o do desemprego e´ 20 vezes inferior ao observado nos dados. Mo-
tivados por este puzzle, no´s estendemos um modelo de real business cycle que
permite ajustamentos do trabalho pelas margens intensiva e extensiva. No mod-
elo, os trabalhadores diferem nas suas skills, as empresas gostam de variedade de
skills, e as famı´lias teˆm custos para ajustar o nu´mero de skills no mercado. O
iii
nosso modelo gera desemprego e produto muito vola´teis e uma forte propagac¸a˜o
de choques.
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Abstract
My thesis is composed of three essays. In the first essay, I am the first to relate
luck and employment protection: I study the effects of employment protection on
the roles of luck, merit, and effort, in determining income inequality. To this end,
I develop a model of heterogeneous workers and firms that meet subject to match-
ing frictions. In the model, an increase in employment protection strengthens the
role of luck and weakens the role of merit in generating income inequality.
In the second essay, Alper C¸enesiz and I study the effects of monetary pol-
icy on aggregate and sectoral outputs. The standard two sector (with durable and
nondurable goods sectors) New Keynesian model generates either negative sec-
toral comovement and aggregate neutrality or no sectoral comovement. These
results are at odds with conventional wisdom and VAR evidence: (i) aggregate
and sectoral outputs move together, and (ii) price and output of the durable sector
react more strongly than those of the nondurable sector. In this essay, we reconcile
the standard two sector New Keynesian model with VAR evidence by introducing
real wage rigidities.
In the third essay, Alper C¸enesiz and I focus on the unemployment volatility
puzzle. The search and matching model, the workhorse model of the labor mar-
ket, has a volatility problem: The standard deviation of unemployment is about
20 times smaller than that in data. Motivated by this puzzle, we extend a real
business cycle model to allow for both intensive and extensive margins of labor
in a novel way. In the model, workers differ in their skills, firms love variety of
skills, and households incur in costs for adjusting the number of skills in the mar-
ket. Our model generates highly volatile unemployment, highly volatile output,
v
and a strong propagation mechanism for output and other relevant macroeconomic
variables.
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Chapter 1
Luck and Employment Protection:
The Role of Heterogeneous Job
Quality
1.1 Introduction
How are luck and employment protection related? For a set of OECD countries,
Figure 1.1 plots the OECD employment protection index against the percentage of
respondents in the World Values Survey who believe that luck determines income.
It suggests that countries with high employment protection tend to have a higher
percentage of people who believe that luck determines income. In this chapter, I
build a search and matching model in which an increase in employment protection
strengthens the role of luck and weakens the role of merit.
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Figure 1.1: Luck and employment protection.
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Note: The figure shows the correlation between the percentage of people who believe that luck determines income and employment
protection for a set of OECD countries. The percentage of people who believes that luck determines incomes is constructed from
the World Values Survey. In this survey, respondents are asked to grade their views over the importance of luck to determine
income in a scale from 1 to 10. 1 is interpreted as “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life”, and 10 is interpreted
as “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success - it’s more a matter of luck and connections.” I take the average of respondents’
answers from 1981 to 2008, and following Alesina et al. (2001), I rescale the answers as a binary variable where respondents that
answer 5 or above are considered to believe that luck determines income. Employment protection is the index built by the OECD
for ”Protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals” in 2013.
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The literature on employment protection focuses on the effects of employment
protection on labor market flows, unemployment, and efficiency. This literature
agrees that employment protection decreases labor market flows because employ-
ment protection discourages both firing and hiring. But it does not agree on the
effect of employment protection on unemployment, which is clear in the empirical
literature surveyed by Addison and Teixeira (2003) and in the theoretical literature
surveyed by Ljungqvist (2002).1 Employment protection also has an ambiguous
effect on efficiency. On the one hand, employment protection improves efficiency
because it motivates the accumulation of firm-specific human capital (Belot et al.,
2007). On the other hand, employment protection deteriorates efficiency because
it promotes capital deepening (Autor et al., 2007), decreases workers’ realloca-
tion (Bassanini et al. 2009, Petrin and Sivadasan 2013, and Samaniego 2006), and
increases absenteeism (Ichino and Riphahn 2005, Jacob 2010, and Riphahn 2004).
The literature on employment protection disregards the relationship between
luck and employment protection. Yet, this relationship matters for agents’ in-
centives: If luck solely determines income, agents are discouraged to exert effort
and to develop skills. For that matter, in this chapter, I extend the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides model to study workers’ income inequality as a result of
unequal luck, merit, and effort.
In the model, firms are heterogeneous. As in Acemoglu (2001), firms decide
to either be good or bad by opening good or bad vacancies. A good firm is more
productive and pays higher wages than a bad firm. And unlike bad firms, good
firms fire workers with productivity below an endogenous cutoff. Workers are
also heterogenous: They are of high or low skill and they draw their productivity
from a skill-specific probability distribution when they meet a firm.
Workers’ income inequality results from unequal luck, merit, and effort. Luck
relates to any labor market outcome that is independent of workers’ merit and ef-
fort. In the model, the probabilities that an unemployed worker finds a good job or
1See also Boeri (2011) for an additional survey, and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2014) and
Samaniego (2006) for recent theoretical contributions with conflicting results for unemployment.
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bad job are independent of workers’ merit and effort, and thus, result solely from
luck: An unemployed low skill worker has the same probabilities to find a good
or a bad job as an unemployed high skill worker.
Merit relates to the effect of skill on labor market outcomes: Because of
the productivity difference between high skill and low skill workers, a high skill
worker has a higher probability to stay employed in good and better paying jobs
than a low skill worker.2
Effort relates to the effect of search on-the-job on labor market outcomes.
And it can also be interpreted as a means to compensate for the lack of luck. In
the model, workers employed in bad firms can search on-the-job to try to move
to good firms. Therefore, workers that were not lucky enough to find good jobs
when unemployed can exert effort to have the opportunity to move from bad to
good jobs.
Employment protection –in the form of firing costs in the model– reshapes the
importance of luck, merit, and effort in generating income inequality. An increase
in firing costs reduces the value of good vacancies: Good firms are forced to retain
less productive workers. Bad firms, on the other hand, benefit from less competi-
tion by good firms. These two effects decrease the proportion of good vacancies:
an increase in firing costs deteriorates the average quality of jobs.
Because firing costs deteriorate the average quality of jobs, workers find less
good jobs. This strengthens the role of luck in generating income inequality be-
tween high skill workers: An increase in firing costs increases inequality between
high skill workers who (are lucky and) find good jobs and those who only find bad
jobs or stay unemployed. It also discourages effort to search on-the-job, further
exacerbating income inequality.
2Although the distinction between luck and merit can be confusing (e.g. a worker may become
more skilled because of its parents ability to send him to better schools), in the model I assume
that skill is only a matter of merit.
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An increase in firing costs also weakens the role of merit in generating income
inequality. An increase in firing costs induces good firms to retain a higher pro-
portion of low skill workers. This implies that low skill workers are more likely to
stay employed in good firms, therefore decreasing inequalities generated by un-
equal merit. An increase in firing costs strengthens the role of luck and weakens
the role of merit.
The results of my chapter differ from the typical insider-outsider theory. An
increase in firing costs is expected to increase the income of insiders (employed
and lucky) relative to outsiders (unemployed and unlucky) because firing costs
make it harder for an unemployed worker to find a job. My model, however, gen-
erates richer results because it features various sources of heterogeneity. First, I
study the effects of firing costs in the income inequality of two types of insid-
ers rather than one (workers employed in good firms and workers employed in
bad firms). Second, I also study the effects of firing costs on income inequality
between workers of unequal skill. And third, I propose a general perspective on
the sources of income inequality: I relate income inequality with three sources –
Luck, merit, and effort.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) also relate luck with institutions. They, how-
ever, focus on the relationship between luck and the size of the welfare state,
whereas I focus on the relationship between luck and employment protection.
Alesina and Angeletos show that identical economies converge to different equi-
libria depending on their agents’ perception of the role of luck in determining
income. They also show that the perception of the role of luck is self-fulfilling. If
agents believe that luck determines income, they prefer a large government with
large redistributive policies. But large redistribution discourages effort, and thus,
agents prefer to rely on their luck than to work harder and face higher taxes. Be-
cause agents believe that luck determines income, they develop institutions that
promote luck instead of merit. The opposite happens if agents believe that merit
determines income. In that case, redistribution is smaller and agents have incen-
tives to work harder as most of the additional income goes to themselves. Be-
cause agents believe that merit determines income, they develop institutions that
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promote merit instead of luck.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe
the model. In Section 1.3, I show how I calibrate the model. In Section 1.4, I
discuss the results of the model: I discuss the effects of employment protection on
income inequality, worker flows, unemployment, and output. And in Section 1.5,
I conclude.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 An overview
The model extends the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model by featuring firms’
and workers’ heterogeneity. I follow Acemoglu (2001) and assume that firms can
be good (high productivity) or bad (low productivity). A firm is good if it opens a
good vacancy at cost κg and a firm is bad if it opens a bad vacancy at cost κb.
Workers are of high or low skill. For each skill type, there is a unit interval
of workers: A fraction uh (ul) of high (low) skill workers is unemployed and a
fraction 1−uh (1−ul) is employed. Prior to the match, workers of the same skill
are identically-productive. But after the match, their productivity differs, as in Jo-
vanovic (1979). After matching with a firm, workers draw their productivity from
a skill-specific uniform probability distribution: [a, a] if low sill; [a + ah, a + ah]
if high skill; where ah is the average productivity difference between a high skill
and a low skill worker. In this labor market, firms open vacancies, and workers
search for jobs while unemployed and while employed in bad firms.
Unemployed workers devote all their time, normalized to 1, to search for
jobs. Following Albrecht and Vroman (2002), I assume that workers and firms
are pooled in a single matching function: The job filling probability is indepen-
dent of firm’s productivity, as well as the job finding probability per unit of search
effort is independent of worker’s skill. This implies that finding a job –and finding
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a good or a bad job– is a merely a matter of luck. Merit differences does not imply
different probabilities.
The matching function is concave, increasing, linearly homogeneous, and is
given by:
M = µ
(
uh + ul + (1− δ)ehnbh + (1− δ)elnbl
)η
(vb + vg)1−η, (1.1)
where eh (el) is the effort of each high (low) skill worker to search on-the-job; nbh
(nbl) is the number of high (low) skill workers employed in bad firms, and thus,
searching on-the-job; vg (vb) is the number of vacancies opened by good (bad)
firms; µ is a scale parameter; δ is the exogenous job destruction probability; and
η is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to total search effort. I
define the job filling probability as
µ(θ) ≡ µθ−η, (1.2)
where θ ≡ vb+vg
(uh+ul+ehnbh+elnbl)
is the vacancy to total search effort ratio. The job
finding probability per unit of effort is simply f(θ) ≡ µ(θ)θ.
As in Hall (2005b), I assume that real wages are rigid. I also assume that real
wages only depend on firm’s productivity, and that good firms pay higher wages
than bad firms. The two wages in the economy guarantee that all workers are will-
ing to work for all firms. They also guarantee that good firms fire the workers with
productivity below an endogenous cutoff a∗ while bad firms have no incentives to
fire their workers.3
Because of the average productivity difference between high skill and low
skill workers, high skill workers are less likely fired. This implies that high skill
workers keep a higher proportion of good and better paying jobs than low skill
workers, leading to unequal income because of unequal merit. To simplify the
model, I further assume that, independent of his productivity draw, a high skill
3With the standard Nash Bargain for wages, I could not consider a case where good firms fire
some of their workers, while bad firms do not. For more details, see Section 1.2.4.
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worker always produces more than his wage; and thus, only low skill workers are
fired: a∗ ∈ (a, a+ ah).
In the model, the sequence of events is as follows: (i) production takes place;
(ii) a fraction δ of employed workers exogenously lose their jobs and start search-
ing in the following period;4 (iii) unemployed workers and workers employed in
bad firms search for jobs; (iv) luck determines which workers find good jobs, bad
jobs, or stay unemployed; (v) firms hire all the workers they are matched with;
(vi) each matched worker draws his productivity from his respective probability
distribution; (vii) the firm knows the productivity of the worker it was matched
with; (viii) merit differences imply that in case a low skill worker draws a pro-
ductivity below a∗, good firms pay a sunk waste firing cost, τ , to fire him; (ix) the
workers that are fired restart searching in the following period.
1.2.2 Workers
Workers discount future at rate β. They earn unemployment benefits b when un-
employed, earn a wage wg when employed in good firms, and earn a wage wb
when employed in bad firms. Workers exogenously lose jobs with a probability
δ, and find a new job with a probability f(θ) per unit of effort. If a worker finds
a job, it is a good job with a probability z, which is the proportion of good vacan-
cies: z ≡ vg
vg+vb
.
As in Krause and Lubik (2006), I assume that workers can search on-the-job
to maximize their lifetime income when employed in bad firms. By searching on-
the-job, workers have the opportunity to increase their lifetime income by moving
to a good job. But they also have a cost, which is measured by the cost function
σ(ei)α, α > 1, i = h, l. eh (el) is the effort of a high (low) skill worker, and sigma
is a scale parameter. To simplify, I assume that workers only move if their job is
4I assume that when a job is destroyed for exogenous reasons, there is no need for the payment
of firing costs. This type of job destruction is present to mimic retirement or any other type of job
destruction agreed between firm and worker without penalty.
8
not exogenously destroyed and they are offered a good job that they can keep.5
A high skill worker can be in one of three states: He can be employed in a good
firm, employed in a bad firm, and unemployed. Let Egh, Ebh, and Uh denote the
lifetime income of a high skill worker in each of these states. Then, the lifetime
incomes of high skill workers are
Egh = wg + β[δUh + (1− δ)Egh], (1.3)
Ebh = wb − σ(eh)α + βδUh+
β(1− δ)[ehf(θ)zEgh + (1− ehf(θ)z)Ebh], (1.4)
Uh = b+ β[f(θ)(zEgh + (1− z)Ebh) + (1− f(θ))Uh]. (1.5)
When employed in good firms, a high skill worker earns a wage wg, and loses
his job with a probability δ. When employed in bad firms, he earns a wage wb, and
loses his job with a probability δ, but he also searches on-the-job. If he does not
lose his job, he has a probability ehf(θ)z to move to a good job, and a probability
1 − ehf(θ)z to stay in the bad job. When unemployed, a high skill worker earns
unemployment benefits b, and has a probability f(θ) to find a job and 1− f(θ) to
stay unemployed. If he finds a job, it is a good job with a probability z and a bad
job with a probability 1− z.
High skill workers choose the effort to search on-the-job, eh, to maximizeEbh.
Taking wages and the probability of finding a good job per unit of effort as given,
the optimal effort satisfies
σα(eh)α−1 = β(1− δ)f(θ)z(Egh − Ebh), (1.6)
where Ebh is evaluated at optimal effort. Effort increases with the probability
of finding a good job and the value gain by moving from a bad to a good job.
5Krause and Lubik (2006) also assumes that the new job is subject to a job destruction proba-
bility even before the worker starts working in the new job. This is equivalent to assuming that the
worker only moves if their current job is not exogenously destroyed.
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Replacing this condition in Eq. 1.4 implies
Ebh = wb + σ(eh)α(α− 1) + β[δUh + (1− δ)Ebh]. (1.7)
As α > 1, a high skill worker increases his lifetime income when employed in
bad firms by searching on-the-job. It is, thus, a means to compensate for the lack
of luck when unemployed: A high skill worker employed in a good firm can exert
effort to search on-the-job to decrease the inequality between those who find good
and bad jobs.
High skill workers are, prior to the match, identically productive and choose
the same effort to search on-the-job when employed in bad firms. Thus, any in-
equality between them does not result from merit or effort differences, but rather
from luck differences.
Low skill workers differ from high skill workers in the ability to keep good
jobs: While a high skill worker always draws a productivity above the cutoff, a
low skill worker draws a productivity above the cutoff with a probability a−a∗
a−a
< 1.
Let Egl, Ebl, and U l denote the lifetime income of a low skill worker employed in
a good firm, employed in a bad firm, and unemployed. These values are
Egl = wg + β[δU l + (1− δ)Egl], (1.8)
Ebl = wb − σ(el)α + βδU l+
β(1− δ)
[
elf(θ)z
a− a∗
a− a
Egl +
(
1− elf(θ)z
a− a∗
a− a
)
Ebl
]
, (1.9)
U l = b+ β
[
f(θ)
(
z
a− a∗
a− a
Egl + (1− z)Ebl
)
+ (1− f(θ))U l
]
. (1.10)
Low skill workers choose the effort to search on-the-job, el, to maximize Ebl.
Taking wages and the probability of finding and keeping a good job per unit of
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effort as given, the optimal effort satisfies
σα(el)α−1 = β(1− δ)f(θ)z
a− a∗
a− a
(Egl −Ebl), (1.11)
where Ebl is evaluated at optimal effort. As low skill workers have smaller chances
to keep good jobs, they exert less effort than high skill workers to search on-the-
job; but the smaller is the cutoff (closer to a), the smaller is this effort difference.
Replacing this condition in Eq. 1.9 implies
Ebl = wb + σ(el)α(α− 1) + β[δU l + (1− δ)Ebl]. (1.12)
1.2.3 Firms
As standard in the search and matching literature, each firm employs one worker.
In the model, firms decide to either be good or bad by opening good or bad va-
cancies. The decision to be good or bad depends on the value of the two types of
vacancies. A good firm has productivity yg, which is greater than the productivity
yb of a bad firm. A good firm also fills a vacancy much faster than a bad firm
because it attracts workers employed in bad firms. But a good firm pays higher
wages and may meet with workers who produce less than their wage. The choice
of vacancy type depends on balancing these effects together with the costs to keep
a vacancy open: κg if a good vacancy, and κb if a bad vacancy. In equilibrium,
however, firms are indifferent between opening good or bad vacancies. As stan-
dard in the literature, the value of a vacancy equals the marginal cost to open a
vacancy, which is 0.
The output of a firm is the product of firm’s productivity with worker’s pro-
ductivity. This implies that the value of a good job filled by a worker who draws
a productivity a is
Jg(a) = yga− wg + β [(1− δ)Jg(a) + δV g] , (1.13)
where V g is the value of a good vacancy. The value of a job is the sum of (i) the
difference between the match’s output and wage and (ii) the continuation value of
11
the job. With a probability δ the job is exogenously destroyed and the firm has a
new vacancy. The value of a good vacancy is
V g = −κg+
µ(θ)β
[
(phu + p
h
e )J
gh + (1− phu − p
h
e )J
gl
]
+ [1− µ(θ)] βV g. (1.14)
This value (as for the value of any other vacancy) depends on the cost to keep
the vacancy open (κg), on-the-job filling probability, on the average value of a
job, and on the continuation value of the vacancy. The job filling probability is
simply µ(θ). The average value of a job, on the other hand, is more complex:
It depends on the probability to find a high skill or a low skill worker, and on
their respective value for a good firm. A good firm meets with a high skill worker
with a probability phu + phe (where phu is the proportion of search effort made by
unemployed high skill workers and phe is the proportion of search effort made by
high skill workers employed in bad firms). And meets with a low skill worker
with a probability 1− phu − phe . Regarding the values of the two types of workers,
Jgh for high skill and Jgl for low skill, they are given by
Jgh = yg
(
a+ ah +
a− a
2
)
− wg + β
[
(1− δ)Jgh + δV g
]
, (1.15)
Jgl =
a− a∗
a− a
[
yg
(
a∗ +
a− a∗
2
)
− wg + β
(
(1− δ)Jgl + δV g
)]
+
a∗ − a
a+ a
(V g − τ). (1.16)
The value of a good job filled by a high skill worker is obtained when a in Eq.
1.13 is replaced by the average productivity of a high skill worker. The value of a
good job filled by a low skill worker is not so simple. There is a probability a−a∗
a−a
that a low skill worker draws a productivity above or equal a∗. In this case, the
average value of a job is now obtained when a Eq. 1.13 is replaced by the average
productivity of low skill workers who draw a productivity above the cutoff. But a
low skill worker has also a probability a
∗−a
a−a
of drawing a productivity below the
cutoff. In this case, the worker is fired, and the firm pays the firing cost τ and has
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a new vacancy.
The value of a worker for a bad firm depends on the ability of the worker to
move from bad to good jobs. This ability is not the same for a high skill worker
and for a low skill worker: High skill workers exert more effort than low skill
workers to search on-the-job because they have a higher probability to stay em-
ployed in good firms; furthermore, low skill workers do not retain all the good
jobs they find while high skill workers do retain. The value of a bad job filled by
a high skill or low skill worker must, then, be adjusted:
J bh(a) = yba− wb+
β
[
(1− δ)(1− ehf(θ)z)J bh(a) + (1− (1− δ)(1− ehf(θ)z))V b
]
, (1.17)
J bl(a) = yba− wb+
β(1− δ)
(
1− el
a− a∗
a− a
f(θ)z
)
J bl(a)+
β
(
1− (1− δ)
(
1− el
a− a∗
a− a
f(θ)z
))
V b, (1.18)
where V b is the value of a bad vacancy. The intuition behind these equations is
the same as for the value of good jobs: These values increase with the output of
the match, decrease with wages, and increase with the continuation value of the
job. But the continuation values of good and bad jobs differ. A bad firm keeps a
high skill worker with a probability (1 − δ)(1 − ehf(θ)z) and a low skill worker
with a probability (1− δ)
(
1− el a−a
∗
a−a
f(θ)z
)
.
6 As for the value of a bad vacancy,
it is
V b = −κb + µ(θ)
[
phuJ
bh + pluJ
bl
]
+ β
[
1− µ(θ)(phu + p
l
u)
]
V b, (1.19)
where plu is the proportion of search effort made by unemployed low skill workers.
Bad firms keep all the workers they meet, and only attract unemployed workers.
6Jobs are exogenously destroyed with a probability δ. If they are not destroyed, a high skill
worker has a probability ehf(θ)z to move to a good job, while a low skill worker has a probability(
el a−a
∗
a−a f(θ)z
)
.
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The value of a bad job is again the weighted average of the values of filling the
vacancy with a high skill and a low skill worker. With a probability µ(θ)phu, bad
firms fill a job with an unemployed high skill worker, and on average the value of
that job is J bh (which is obtained when a in Eq.1.17 is replaced by the average
productivity draw of a high skill worker); With a probability µ(θ)plu bad firms fill
a job with an unemployed low skill worker, and on average the value of that job is
J bl (which is given by Eq.1.18 with a replaced by the average productivity draw
of a low skill worker).
As mentioned above, firms open vacancies until V g = V b = 0 because of
the free-entry condition. Then, solving Eqs. 1.14 and 1.19 imply the following
equilibrium conditions:
κg = µ(θ)β
[
(phu + p
h
e )
yg[a+ ah + (a− a)/2] − wg
1− (1− δ)β
]
+
µ(θ)β
[
(1− phu − p
h
e )
(
a− a∗
a− a
yg[a∗ + (a− a∗)/2] − wg
1− (1− δ)β
−
a∗ − a
a− a
τ
)]
, (1.20)
κb = µ(θ)βphu
yb[a+ ah + (a− a)/2] − wb
1− (1− δ)(1 − ehf(θ)z)β
+µ(θ)βplu
yb[a+ (a− a)/2] − wb
1− (1− δ)(1 − el a−a
∗
a−a f(θ)z)β
, (1.21)
where I have also used Eqs. 1.15-1.18.
1.2.4 Cutoff
A good firm keeps a worker if it is better off keeping him than firing him: The
firm contrasts the value of keeping the worker with the value of firing him. If
positive, the firm keeps the worker; if negative, the firm fires the worker. The
value of keeping a worker who draws a productivity a is given by the value of a
good job, Jg(a), while the value of firing is given by V g − τ . As V g = 0, the firm
is indifferent between keeping or firing a worker in the case that Jg(a) + τ = 0.
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Making use of Eq. 1.13 and solving for a, I find the cutoff equation:
a∗ =
wg − τ(1− (1− δ)β)
yg
. (1.22)
In case there are no firing costs, τ = 0, good firms keep workers that produce at
least as much as their wage. But if firing costs exist, τ > 0, good firms are forced
to retain workers who produce less than their wage.
1.2.5 Wages
To close the model, I do not assume that wages are determined by Nash Bargain.
With Nash Bargain, the higher is the surplus of the match, the higher are the in-
centives to hire the worker. The surplus of the match depends positively on the
output of the match, and thus, is on average higher in good firms. This implies
that with Nash Bargain, bad firms are more likely to fire a worker than good firms.
In this chapter, however, I wish to study the effects of employment protection
in a context where good firms demand more productive workers than bad firms. In
particular, I wish to study the effects of employment protection in a context where
the following conditions are met: (i) good firms only wish to retain the most pro-
ductive low skill workers they meet; (ii) good firms wish to keep all high skill
workers they meet; and (iii) bad firms wish to keep all workers they meet. The
simplest way to achieve this is to follow Hall (2005b) and Shimer (2012b) and
assume that wages are rigid. Thus, I assume that the two wages in the economy
–the one set by good firms and the one set by bad firms– are rigid and satisfy con-
ditions (i)-(iii). These wages, however, must also motivate workers to find jobs.
In particular, they must also satisfy the following conditions: (iv) all workers are
willing to work for bad firms, and (v) all workers are willing to work for good
firms. In the remainder of this subsection, I show how to set wg and wb such that
they satisfy conditions (i)-(v).7
7These conditions are an extension of the conditions in Hall (2005b) and Shimer (2012b). In
these papers, wages are set such that workers are willing to work, and firms are willing to hire. In
this chapter, however, firms’ and workers’ heterogeneity requires further conditions.
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The cutoff equation, Eq. 1.22, can be rearranged as
wg = yga∗ + τ(1− (1− δ)β). (1.23)
The first condition (good firms only wish to retain the most productive low
skill workers they meet), is equivalent to impose that the cutoff is in the distribu-
tion of productivity draws of low skill workers, a∗ ∈ (a, a). Applying this to Eq.
1.23 implies that
wg ∈ (yga+ τ(1 − (1− δ)β), yga+ τ(1 − (1− δ)β)).
To satisfy the second condition (good firms wish to keep all high skill workers
they meet), I impose that whatever the productivity draw of a high skill worker,
the value (for a good firm) of keeping him exceeds the value of firing: wg must
be such that for the high skill worker who draws the smallest productivity draw,
a+ ah, the value of keeping him exceeds the value of firing. Applying this to Eq.
1.23 implies that
wg < yg(a+ ah) + τ(1− (1− δ)β).
To satisfy the third condition (bad firms wish to keep all workers they meet),
I impose that independent of the productivity draw of a worker, the value (for
a bad firm) of keeping him exceeds the value of firing. The workers with the
lowest productivity are low skill workers who draw the productivity a. Using an
analogous equation to Eq. 1.23, where wg is replaced by wb and yg is replaced by
yb, I find that the third condition is satisfied when
wb < yba+ τ(1 − (1− δ)β).
To satisfy the forth and fifth conditions, I start by imposing that wb > b and
wg > b. I divide the forth condition (all workers are willing to work for bad firms),
in two parts: Bad firms must attract low skill workers, Ebl−U l > 0, and high skill
workers, Ebh − Uh > 0. The value of being unemployed for a high skill worker
is greater than the value of being an unemployed for a low skill worker because
high skill workers have better odds of keeping good jobs. Thus, if wb satisfies
Ebh−Uh > 0, it also satisfies Ebl−U l > 0. Because of this, I focus on satisfying
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the condition that Ebh − Uh > 0. Using Eqs. 1.3, 1.5, and 1.7 I find that
wb > −σ(eh)α(α− 1)+
(1− β)b(1− (1 − δ)β) + (1− β)βf(θ)zwg
1− (1− δ)β − β2δf(θ)− β(1− (1− δ)β)(1 − f(θ))− (1− β)βf(θ)(1 − z)
(1.24)
is necessary to satisfy Ebh − Uh > 0.
The fifth condition (all workers are willing to work for good firms), is satisfied
in combination with the other conditions. Because any worker produces on aver-
age more in a good firm than in a bad firm (yg > yb), conditions (i) and (iii) imply
that wg > wb. Thus, if conditions (i), (iii), and (iv) are satisfied, then condition
(v) is also satisfied.
1.2.6 Equilibrium
I now show the equilibrium conditions. The high and low skill unemployment
rates are
uh ≡
δ
δ + f(θ)
, (1.25)
ul ≡
δ
δ + zf(θ)a−a
∗
a−a
+ (1− z)f(θ)
. (1.26)
These unemployment rates differ because of the difference in the likelihood of
keeping good jobs: High skill workers only become unemployed if their jobs are
exogenously destroyed, while low skill workers also become unemployed if they
draw a productivity below a∗ in good firms.
All workers employed in bad firms, nbh + nbl, search on-the-job. To find total
search effort, I start by finding nbh and nbl. Each period, there are uh high skill
unemployed workers and ul low skill unemployed workers. From those, every
period a fraction f(θ)(1 − z) find bad jobs. High skill workers whose jobs are
not exogenously destroyed have a probability f(θ)z of finding a good job per unit
of effort, and choose effort eh: A fraction (1 − δ)f(θ)zeh of high skill workers
searching on-the-job move to a good job, and a fraction (1 − δ)(1 − f(θ)zeh)
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do not move. Thus, the number of high skill workers employed in bad firms and
searching on-the-job is
nbh =
uhf(θ)(1− z)
1− (1− δ)(1− f(θ)zeh)
. (1.27)
The low skill workers whose jobs are not exogenously destroyed have a proba-
bility f(θ)z a−a∗
a−a
of finding a good job per unit of effort, and choose effort el: A
fraction (1 − δ)f(θ)z a−a∗
a−a
el of high skill workers searching on-the-job moves to
a good job, and a fraction (1 − δ)(1 − f(θ)z a−a∗
a−a
el) does not move. Thus, the
number of low skill workers employed in bad firms and searching on-the-job is
nbl =
ulf(θ)(1− z)
1− (1− δ)(1− f(θ)z a−a
∗
a−a
el)
. (1.28)
The proportions of search effort made by unemployed high skill, unemployed
low skill, and employed high skill workers are
phu =
uh
uh + (1− δ)ehnbh + (1− δ)elnbl + ul
, (1.29)
plu =
ul
uh + (1− δ)ehnbh + (1− δ)elnbl + ul
, (1.30)
phe =
(1− δ)ehnbh
uh + (1− δ)ehnbh + (1− δ)elnbl + ul
. (1.31)
As long as wages satisfy the conditions in the previous subsection, an equilib-
rium in this model is characterized by the set (a∗, θ, z, eh, el) that satisfy Eqs. 1.6,
1.11, 1.20, 1.21, and 1.22.8
1.3 Calibration
The calibration is summarized in Table 3.1. I calibrate the model to the US econ-
omy, and each period as a month. In the US economy there are almost no firing
8Before solving the system, I must replace Eqs. 1.3, 1.7, 1.8, 1.12, and 1.25-1.31, in Eqs. 1.6,
1.11, 1.20, 1.21, and 1.22.
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Table 1.1: Benchmark Parameters
Discount Rate: β = 0.996
Job Destruction Rate: δ = 0.026
Matching Function Scale Parameter: µ = 0.45
Matching Function Elasticity Parameter: η = 0.5
Unemployment Benefits: b = 0
Elasticity of the on-the-job cost function: α = 2
Scale parameter of the on-the-job cost function: σ = 0.751
Productivity of good firms: yg = 1.05
Productivity of bad firms: yg = 1
Lowest productivity draw: a = 1
Highest productivity draw: a = 1.25
High-Low skill average productivity difference: ag = 0.25
Good firm cost to open a vacancy: κg = 3.068
Bad firm cost to open a vacancy: κb = 0.776
costs, and thus, like Samaniego (2006), I set τ = 0.9 I set β = 0.996 which implies
an annual interest rate of 5%. I set the elasticity of the matching function η = 0.5
consistent with the literature surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). As in
Shimer (2005), I use µ to target a monthly job finding probability, f(θ), equal to
0.45. I also set θ = 1, which implies that µ(θ) = f(θ) = 0.45. Unemployment
benefits b, contrary to models that assume Nash Bargain for wages, do not play
an important role in this model because wages are exogenous. Thus, I simply set
b = 0.
Regarding the calibration of the productivity difference –between firms and
between labor types,– I start by normalizing a and yb to 1. Garibaldi and Moen
(2010) set a productivity difference between the most and the least productive
firms of 8%. In my model, good firms are on average endogenously more produc-
tive than bad firms because they only keep low skill workers that draw productivity
above the cutoff, a∗, while bad firms keep all workers. Thus, I assume a smaller
exogenous productivity difference and set yg = 1.05.
9The US economy has the second lowest OECD employment protection index, as is clear in
Fig. 1.1.
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I assume that the productivity difference between the highest and smallest pro-
ductivity draw, a−a, equals the parameter governing the average productivity dif-
ference between high skill and low skill workers, ah. As a∗ < a, this assumption
guarantees that high skill workers are never fired. Albrecht and Vroman (2002)
assume that the productivity of high skill jobs is between 20% and 40% higher
than the productivity of low skill jobs, and only high skill workers can work in
high skill jobs. I start by setting ah = 0.25, and later experiment with ah ranging
from 0.15 to 0.35. By making this experiment, as I keep a∗ constant, a change
in ah = a − a changes the proportion of workers that are fired. Finally, I set the
cutoff a∗ = 1.05, such that 20% of low skill workers that meet good firms are
fired, and later experiment with 1.025 and 1.075.10
In reality firms cannot be simply divided between good and bad firms. This
makes the proportion of good vacancies in overall vacancies, z, difficult to tar-
get.11 What makes a firm a good firm? What makes a firm a bad firm? I avoid
these questions and start by assuming that half of the vacancies created are good
and set z = 0.5. Later I experiment with z = 0.3 and z = 0.7 to better understand
its role in the model. The proportion of jobs exogenously destroyed, δ, is used to
target the average US unemployment rate in the postwar period, 5.7%.
I use the work of Fallick and Fleischman (2004) on the job-to-job movements
in the US to target eh. Fallick and Fleischman report that on average a worker
that reports to be actively searching on-the-job have an 11% probability to change
employers. This is also the number targeted by Moscarini (2001). In my model,
this probability is eh(1 − δ)f(θ)z for high skill workers. But an 11% probability
to move between jobs per month implies eh = 0.51. This means that employed
workers exert half the effort that unemployed workers do to find jobs, which seems
10I calibrate the proportion of workers fired to be small to be more consistent with two assump-
tions of the model. If the proportion of low skill workers fired is large, it would be more realistic
to assume two matching functions (one for high skill workers and one for low skill workers) in-
stead of one. And it would also be more realistic to assume that good firms could reject low skill
workers without the need to hire them first. In the latter case, firing costs would have no effect in
my model.
11Krause and Lubik (2006), for example, assume that the weight of the output of bad firms in
total output is 0.4.
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unrealistic because of time limitations. Furthermore, recall that high skill workers
only move between jobs if they find a good job to simplify the analysis. Thus, if
instead workers move between employers if they have an offer from a new em-
ployer, the probability of moving between employers would be eh(1− δ)f(θ). In
this case, eh = 0.258, which seems more realistic.12 Christensen et al. (2005)
estimate an elasticity of the cost function with respect to effort, α, of 1.84 for the
private sector, 1.41 for skilled workers, and 2.3 for unskilled workers.13 In my
benchmark calibration, I set α = 2, but in the robustness checks, I set α = 1.41
and α = 2.3. Finally, I set σ to target eh, and set kb and kg to target z and a∗.
1.4 Results
What are the effects of firing costs? How do luck, merit, and effort contribute to
lifetime income inequality under different levels of firing costs?14 I address these
questions by numerically simulating the model.
1.4.1 The Effects of Firing Costs
Good Firms
Figure 1.2 plots the proportion of good vacancies, z = vg
vg+vb
, and good jobs as
a function of τ .15 The proportion of good vacancies falls dramatically with the
increase of firing costs. For example, with firing costs equivalent to one and a half
months of wages paid by good firms, τ = 1.5wg, the proportion of good vacancies
12I did not use the average of effort of high skill and low skill workers, but in the robustness
section, I experiment with eh = 0.5 and also with eh = 0.15. This range encompasses the average
effort of high skill and low skill workers.
13Their definition of skilled and unskilled workers, however, differ from the high skill and low
skill workers in my model.
14In the remainder of this chapter, I refer to lifetime income inequality as simply income in-
equality for the sake of brevity.
15The proportion of good jobs is the mean of the proportion of high skill and low skill workers
employed in good firms:
(
1−uh−nbh
1−uh +
1−ul−nbl
1−ul
)
/2.
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falls by 23%.
The fall of the proportion of good vacancies follows from the fall in their value.
As firing costs increase, good firms are forced to retain less productive workers
(decreasing the cutoff) and pay the increased cost for the workers they do fire.
On-the-job search propagates the fall of the value of good vacancies. As the
proportion of good vacancies falls, both high skill and low skill workers decrease
on-the-job search. And because the cutoff decreases, low skill workers decrease
their effort to search on-the-job by less than high skill workers (see Panel B of
Figure 1.3 and Panel C of 1.4). Thus, good firms not only attract less workers,
they attract less productive workers.
Figure 1.2: The effect of firing costs on good jobs and vacancies.
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Good Jobs
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Note: The figure shows the proportion of good jobs and good vacancies (z), as a function
of firing costs, τ . Both are relative to the steady-state without firing costs (τ = 0).
Bad firms, on the other hand, benefit from higher firing costs. As they keep
all workers, a shift in firing costs has no direct effect. Yet, they benefit from less
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competition from good firms (which open less vacancies) and from the fall in the
effort to search on-the-job. In the end, an increase in firing costs deteriorates the
average quality of vacancies and jobs.
Luck, Merit, and Effort
Figs. 1.3 and 1.4 show how firing costs change the roles of luck, merit, and effort
in generating income inequality. Luck relates to any labor market outcome that is
independent of worker’s merit and effort. High skill workers have the same merit
(the same average productivity) and exert the same effort (to search on-the-job).
Thus, inequalities between high skill workers result merely from unequal luck.16
Panel A of Fig. 1.3 shows that income inequality among high skill workers in-
creases with firing costs. As firing costs increase, the good job finding probability
decreases. This discourages effort to search on-the-job, thereby accentuating the
inequality between those who find good and bad jobs. Furthermore, when unem-
ployed, high skill workers have smaller chances to find goods jobs: Only very
lucky high skill workers are able to find good jobs.
16The roles of luck and merit are, however, ambiguous in generating income inequality between
low skill workers. Low skill workers only keep a good job if they draw a productivity above the
cutoff. If they do not keep a good job is because of a lack of merit: They produce less than their
wage. Yet, they are also unlucky if they do not stay employed because they could have drawn a
productivity above the cutoff. For that reason, I disregard the effect of firing costs in generating
income inequality between low skill workers.
23
Figure 1.3: The effect of firing costs on inequality, effort, and good job finding probability.
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Note: The figure shows income inequalities between high skill workers, effort of high skill workers, and
good job finding probability as a function of firing costs, τ . In Panel A, the figure shows income inequalities
relative to the steady-state without firing costs (τ = 0). These income inequalities are only between high
skill workers: The figure shows income inequality between high skill workers who find good jobs and those
who find bad jobs (Egh − Ebh) and income inequality between high skill workers who find bad jobs and
those who are unemployed (Ebh−Uh). In Panel B, the figure shows the effort of high skill workers to search
on-the-job (eh). In Panel C, the figure shows the good job finding probability per unit of search effort.
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Figure 1.4: The effect of firing costs on inequality and effort.
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Note: The figure shows income inequality between high skill and low skill workers, inequalities between
low skill workers, and effort of low skill workers as a function of firing costs, τ . In Panels A and B, the
figure shows income inequalities relative to the steady-state without firing costs (τ = 0). In Panel A, it
shows income inequality between high skill and low skill workers (measured by Uh − U l). In Panel B, it
shows income inequality between low skill workers: The figure shows income inequality between low skill
workers who keep good jobs and those who keep bad jobs (Egl − Ebl) and income inequality between low
skill workers who keep bad jobs and those who are unemployed (Ebl − U l). In Panel C, the figure shows
the effort of low skill workers to search on-the-job (el).
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Merit relates to the effect of skill on labor market outcomes. High skill work-
ers are on average more productive than low skill workers. For that matter, high
skill workers retain all good and better paying jobs while low skill workers only
retain a fraction, allowing high skill workers to attain on average a higher income
than low skill workers. An increase in firing costs, however, reduces the effect
of skill on labor market outcomes. An increase in firing costs makes good firms
retain a higher proportion of low skill workers. This implies that low skill workers
become more likely to stay employed in good firms, decreasing income inequality
between high and low skill workers (see Panel A of Fig. 1.4). In the extreme,
when good firms do not fire any worker, the inequality between high skill and low
skill workers ceases to exist.
Effort relates to the effect of search on-the-job on labor market outcomes.
Workers employed in bad firms can compensate for their lack of luck (because
they only found a bad job) by exerting effort to search on-the-job. Thus, effort is
a tool for workers to lessen the relevance of luck in generating income inequality.
Panel B of Fig. 1.3 plots the effort of high skill workers to search on-the-job. An
increase in firing costs discourages high skill workers to exert effort because it
becomes harder to find a good job, exacerbating the effect of luck in generating
income inequality.17
In the end, firing costs strengthen the role of luck and weaken the role of merit.
By deteriorating the average quality of jobs, high skill workers are forced to stay
employed in bad firms and to rely more on their luck to meet good firms. Further-
more, the inequality generated by unequal merit decreases with firing costs as low
skill workers are able to retain a higher proportion of good jobs.
Labor Market Flows, Unemployment, and Efficiency
To compare with the literature on employment protection, I also study labor mar-
ket flows, unemployment, and efficiency using my model. Panels A and B of Fig.
17Panel C of 1.4 plots the effort of low skill workers to search on-the-job. They also reduce
effort, but by less than high skill workers. Although low skill workers also find less good jobs,
they keep a higher proportion of those they find because of the lower cutoff.
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1.5 plot workers fired and job-to-job movements. As expected, workers fired de-
crease because good firms retain less productive workers. Job-to-job movements,
on the other hand, increase as in Postel-Vinay and Turon (2014). Although, for
each worker it is less likely to move from bad to good jobs (less effort and less
probability per unit of effort), the number of workers employed in bad firms (will-
ing to search on-the-job) goes up. Furthermore, low skill workers are more likely
to stay employed in good firms when firing costs are high. It turns out that the
latter two effects are stronger than the former.
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), unemployment drops in my model,
and it drops for both types of workers (see Panel C of Fig. 1.5). This follows from
two reasons: (i) low skill workers are less likely fired from good jobs; and (ii) bad
firms benefit from higher firing costs, and thus, open more vacancies. But lower
unemployment does not mean that resources are used more efficiently. Also con-
sistent with Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Panel D of Fig. 1.5 shows that out-
put drops with the increase in firing costs, suggesting that the higher employment
is applied in a less productive manner. In the model of Mortensen and Pissarides,
output drops because firms require stronger negative productivity shocks to fire a
worker. In my model, output also drops because good firms are forced to retain
less productive workers. Moreover, the increase in the number of bad vacancies
leads to lower unemployment but also lower average job productivity. Thus, it is
misleading to look only at the number of jobs; it is also important to look at the
quality of jobs.
The harmful effect of firing costs on output can be much larger in the context of
economic growth. Although the model is not suited for the analysis of economic
growth, I believe the reader would agree that a higher number of good jobs and a
higher proportion of good jobs filled by high skill workers should foster growth. If
that is the case, the static results in my model would extend to the rate of economic
growth, with much larger negative effects on output.18
18This is consistent with Bartelsman et al. (2011), Bassanini et al. (2009), and OECD (2010),
among others, who focus on the harmful effect of firing costs on workers’ reallocation with nega-
tive implications for economic growth.
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Figure 1.5: The effect of firing costs on worker flows, unemployment, and output.
0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 A: Workers Fired
τ
0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14 B: Job−to−Job Movements
τ
0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
0.052
0.053
0.054
0.055
0.056
0.057
0.058
0.059
0.06 C: Unemployment
τ
 
 
u
uh
ul
0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
0.992
0.993
0.994
0.995
0.996
0.997
0.998
0.999
1 D: Output
τ
Note: The figure shows worker flows (workers fired in Panel A and workers who move from bad to good
jobs in Panel B), unemployment, and output as a function of firing costs, τ . In Panels A, B, and D, Worker
flows and output are relative to the steady-state without firing costs (τ = 0). In Panel C, the figure shows
the proportion of workers unemployed. In particular, it shows aggregate unemployment (u), high skill
unemployment (uh), and low skill unemployment (ul).
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1.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Fig. 1.6 and Table 3.2 report the sensitivity analysis of the model. Fig. 1.6 shows
how the proportion of workers fired changes the effect of firing costs. The param-
eter of interest is the highest productivity draw possible, a = ah + a. A higher
a implies a smaller proportion of low skill workers fired because it is more likely
to attain a productivity above the cutoff, a∗ = 1.05.19 Under the benchmark cali-
bration (a = 1.25) the proportion of workers fired is 20%, but in Figure 1.6, this
proportion moves from 33% (a = 1.15) to 14% (a = 1.35).
Clearly, the proportion of low skill workers fired has important quantitative
implications: The effect of firing costs decreases as the proportion of workers
fired drops. Yet, it does not have important qualitative implications: An increase
in firing costs always deteriorates the proportion of good vacancies, strengthens
the role of luck, and weakens the role of merit.
In Table 3.2, I also conduct a sensitivity analysis to the cutoff, a∗. A change in
the initial (without firing costs) cutoff also changes the proportion of workers fired
by good firms: A higher a∗ implies a higher proportion of workers fired by good
firms. These results corroborate the results in Figure 1.6. A higher proportion of
workers fired (in the case of no firing costs) increases the effect of changes in the
firing costs, but has no effect on the qualitative results of the model.
19Remember that this proportion is a
∗
−a
a−a∗ .
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Figure 1.6: How does the proportion of low skill workers fired in good firms changes the effects of firing costs?
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Note: The figure shows the ratio of the value in the steady-state with τ = wg with respect to the value in
the steady-state without firing costs (τ = 0) as a function of the worker’s maximum productivity draw, a. It
also shows how the proportion of low skill workers fired in good firms (by means of changes in the worker’s
productivity difference, a − a, for given cutoff, a∗) changes the effects of firing costs: An increase in a
decreases the proportion of low skill workers fired in good firms. For example, for a = 1.2 the proportion
is 25%, while for a = 1.25 the proportion is 20%.
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Table 1.2: Sensitivity Analysis
z Egh −Ebh Ebh − Uh Uh − U l eh
τ = 0 τ = 0.5 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 0.5 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 0.5 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 0.5 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 0.5 τ = 1 τ = 2
Benchmark -8 -15 -24 5 9 16 0 1 1 -32 -60 -100 -3 -5 -9
a∗ = 1.025 -8 -13 -13 5 8 8 0 0 0 -59 -100 -100 -3 -4 -4
a∗ = 1.075 -8 -14 -26 5 9 18 1 2 4 -22 -43 -78 -3 -5 -10
z = 0.30 -3 -7 -13 1 3 6 0 0 0 -31 -60 -100 -1 -3 -6
z = 0.70 -14 -23 -34 10 18 29 1 2 3 -32 -60 -100 -4 -7 -11
eh = 0.15 -5 -10 -18 2 5 9 1 2 4 -31 -60 -100 -2 -5 -8
eh = 0.50 -13 -23 -35 10 20 33 -1 -1 -2 -32 -61 -100 -3 -5 -9
η = 0.3 -14 -23 -35 8 15 24 0 -1 -1 -33 -62 -100 -4 -8 -14
η = 0.7 -6 -11 -18 4 7 13 1 1 2 -31 -60 -100 -2 -4 -7
yg = 1.02 -8 -15 -24 5 10 16 0 0 -1 -33 -63 -100 -3 -5 -9
yg = 1.10 -7 -14 -24 5 9 16 2 3 5 -29 -57 -100 -2 -5 -9
α = 1.41 -4 -8 -14 3 5 8 0 1 1 -31 -60 -100 -3 -6 -11
α = 2.30 -10 -18 -29 6 12 20 1 1 1 -32 -61 -100 -3 -5 -9
Note: The table shows the robustness of the results of the model: It shows the percentage change when firing costs, τ , increases
from 0 to 0.5, 1, and 2, under different parametrizations of the model.
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These results also give a tentative explanation for the conclusions of Bassanini
et al. (2009) and OECD (2010). These studies conclude that economic growth
falls by more in industries where employment protection more likely binds –so,
in industries with a higher proportion of workers fired and low a or high a∗. They
suggest that it follows from lower workers’ reallocation. Besides suggesting work-
ers’ reallocation, my results also suggest it can follow from a deterioration of the
average quality of jobs in the economy. The intuition is simple. When a is low
(or a∗ is high), good firms need to fire a higher a proportion of their workers. This
implies that for a given change in firing costs, good firms must retain a higher pro-
portion of workers who produce less than their wage. Thus, the value of opening
a good firm decreases more rapidly with firing costs when a is low or the cutoff
(in the case of no firing costs) is high.
I also summarize other robustness checks in Table 3.2. I check whether the
results of the model are robust to different elasticity of the matching function with
respect to search effort, η, productivity of good firms, yg, elasticity of the search
on-the-job cost function with respect to effort, α, initial proportion of good va-
cancies, z, and high skill workers initial search on-the-job effort, eh. With some
minor exceptions, the results do not change qualitatively: An increase in firing
costs deteriorates the average quality of jobs, strengthens the role of luck, and
weakens the role of merit. Quantitatively, yg is almost irrelevant for the effects of
firing costs. But the effects of firing costs are larger when α, z, and eh are high,
and when η is low.
1.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I build a search and matching model in which high employment
protection tends to generate a luck rewarding economy: When employment pro-
tection increases, the model predicts that luck tends to play a primary role in gen-
erating income inequality, while merit tends to play a minor –if not inexistent–
role.
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An increase in employment protection has major implications for incentives.
I show that an increase in employment protection decreases incentives to search
on-the-job, which amplifies the negative effect of firing costs on the value of good
vacancies. Furthermore, there are other incentives that are not considered in the
model. For example, agents invest in their education and develop their skills be-
cause they believe it will increase their future income. But if it only matters to be
lucky, why should they try to be skilled?
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Chapter 2
Sticky-Price Models, Durable
Goods, and Real Wage Rigidities
2.1 Introduction
Using the standard two sector New Keynesian model, Barsky et al. (2007) elo-
quently demonstrate that the degree of price flexibility in the durable goods sector
dictates the response of aggregate output to a monetary shock. When nondurable-
goods’ prices are sticky but durable-goods’ prices are flexible, the outputs of the
two sectors move in opposite directions, leaving aggregate output unchanged.
Aggregate output, however, reacts significantly when nondurable- and durable-
goods’ prices are sticky. But then nondurables output virtually does not react. In
other terms, the standard New Keynesian model generates either negative sectoral
comovement and aggregate neutrality or no sectoral comovement.
Yet, VAR evidence overwhelmingly suggests positive comovement in the af-
termath of a monetary shock (see, for example, Barsky et al. (2003), Erceg and
Levin 2006, Monacelli 2009). Two stylized facts are that (i) aggregate output
and sectoral outputs move together, and (ii) price and output of the durable sector
react more strongly than those of the nondurable sector. Moreover, the distinc-
tive feature of a business cycle is that the output of many sectors of the economy
move together. Therefore, the New Keynesian model, the workhorse in analysis
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of monetary business cycles, needs to be reconciled with these facts. We do so
simply by introducing real wage rigidities into an otherwise standard two sector
New Keynesian model.
In Section 2, we document VAR evidence for the U.S. Economy. Our evi-
dence confirms the results of previous studies: The outputs of the durable and
nondurable sector comove. It also confirms the results of Altig et al. (2011), Am-
ato and Laubach (2003), Christiano et al. (2005): Our evidence confirms that the
reaction of real wages to monetary shocks is rather muted. One other supporting
argument for the existence of real wage rigidities flows from the Dunlop-Tarshis
observation –that hours worked and real wages are uncorrelated (Dunlop 1938
and Tarshis 1939). As a modeling feature, the crucial role of real wage rigidi-
ties in propagating shocks has long been recognized as well. In his review of the
business cycle theory, Lucas (1981) argues that models relying on systematic real
wage movements are doomed to failure. Ball and Romer (1990) show that real
wage rigidities amplify the effects of nominal rigidities. Hall (2005b) shows that
real wage rigidities generate volatile unemployment and vacancies in the context
of search and matching models. Blanchard and Galı´ (2007) show that real wage
rigidities generate a trade-off between output and inflation stabilization. More
recently, Shimer (2012b) shows that real wage rigidities can account for jobless
recoveries.
To model real wage rigidities, we follow Blanchard and Galı´ (2007): We mod-
ify the labor supply equation of the standard New Keynesian model by assuming
that real wages are a weighted sum of lagged real wages and the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. Without any other change to the
standard model, this simple modification removes the above mentioned puzzling
theoretical results, i.e., it obtains non-neutral money and positive comovement be-
tween sectoral outputs. Using our modification we first show that when durable-
goods’ prices are perfectly flexible, (i) durables output reacts sharply to monetary
shocks; (ii) aggregate output and nondurables output react similarly and less dra-
matically than durables output; (iii) the durable-price index reacts more strongly
than the nondurable-price index. Using our modification we then show that these
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three results also hold as long as durable-goods’ prices are (slightly) more flexible
than nondurable-goods’ prices.1
The economic intuition behind our results is also simple: Real wage rigidities
decrease the elasticity of marginal costs, suppressing the reaction of prices in both
sectors. This, in turn, renders positive comovement and aggregate non-neutrality
possible.
Our reconciliation of the two sector New Keynesian model is not the first one.
Bouakez et al. (2011) and Sudo (2012) argue that inputoutput interactions help
solve the comovement problem. In the models employed in both papers, because
the production of nondurable goods requires durable goods as inputs, and vice
versa, and because nondurable-goods’ prices are sticky, the pass-through of the
monetary impulse into durable-goods’ prices is limited. Accordingly, durables
output can move in the same direction of the change in aggregate demand. Carl-
strom and Fuerst (2010) document that adding three features –sticky nominal
wages, adjustment costs in housing construction, and habit formation in consumption–
into an otherwise standard model brings it closer to reality. Sticky nominal wages
is enough to generate sectoral comovement in the first quarter. But adjustment
costs in housing construction are required to generate sectoral comovement for
more than one quarter. Monacelli (2009) and Sterk (2010) discuss the role of
credit market frictions in accounting for positive sectoral comovement.
We think that our approach has the advantages of parsimony and robustness.
The way we modify the standard model is very simple: We replace only one
equation to obtain our model with real wage rigidities. Our results are robust to
all reasonable parameter values.
In the remainder of the chapter, we start by documenting VAR evidence for
the U.S. economy in Section 2.2. To make our chapter self-contained and our
1The condition that durable-goods’ prices are more flexible than nondurable-goods’ prices is
in line with the empirical evidence documented in the literature on micro-price data (for a survey,
see Klenow and Malin 2010).
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model easy to compare to the one analyzed in Barsky et al. (2007), in Section 2.3
we briefly present their benchmark model, which, hereafter, we call the standard
model. In Section 2.4, we incorporate real wage rigidities simply by modifying
the labor supply equation of the standard model. Also in the same section we an-
alytically assess the role of real wage rigidities in the neutrality and comovement
problems. In Section 2.5, we calibrate the two models, and present the results of
our numerical simulations. In Section 2.6, we offer some concluding remarks.
2.2 Estimation
In this section, we empirically assess the behavior of durable goods consumption,
nondurable goods consumption, and real wages in response to identified monetary
shocks in the U.S. economy. We do so by means of a quarterly VAR model for
the US economy that we set out as follows:
yt =
L∑
j=1
Ajyt−j +Bǫt. (2.1)
yt is a vector of four variables: Real durable consumption, real nondurable con-
sumption, real wages, and the federal funds rate; and ǫt is a vector of contempo-
raneous disturbances.2 All variables, except for the federal funds rate, are in logs.
Furthermore, we estimate the VAR with a constant, a linear trend, four lags, and
for the period 1980:1 to 2007:4.3
2We define: (i) real durables consumption as the To¨rnqvist index of the sum of personal con-
sumption expenditure in durable goods with investment housing, both obtained from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis; (ii) real nondurable consumption as the To¨rnqvist index of the sum of per-
sonal consumption expenditures in nondurables goods with services, both also obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis; and (iii) real wages as real compensation per hour in the nonfarm
business sector, obtained from Federal Reserve Economic Data. The federal funds rate is also
from the Federal Reserve Economic Data.
3As argued by Amato and Laubach (2003), we estimate the VAR over a period that policy is
most likely characterized by constant parameters: The great moderation period. Therefore, our
sample starts in 1980:1 as Amato and Laubach (2003) and finishes in 2007:4 before the global
burst of the financial crisis.
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Figure 2.1: Estimated Impulse Responses
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Note: The figure shows estimated impulse responses to a monetary policy tightening (Sample period
1980:1–2007:4; 95% confidence bands).
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Our estimation results confirms the results of previous studies: (i) Monetary
policy has a statiscally insignificant effect in real wages, which confirms the re-
sults of Altig et al. (2011), Amato and Laubach (2003), and Christiano et al.
(2005); (ii) durable consumption comoves with nondurable consumption, which
confirms the results of Barsky et al. (2003); (iii) and durable consumption has
a much higher peak response than nondurable consumption, which also confirms
Barsky et al. (2003). Our assessment, however, has the advantage to confirm these
stylized facts in a single VAR estimation.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 The Household
The household supplies labor, nt, and capital, k, to the firms in durable and non-
durable sectors. The stock of capital is fixed. Because production factors are
perfectly mobile, the prices of these factors do not differ across sectors. The
household chooses the consumption of nondurable goods, ct, the stock of durable
goods, dt, labor supply, and purchases of durable goods, xt, to maximize her util-
ity
Et
[
∞∑
i=0
β
(
ψc ln ct+i + ψd ln dt+i −
φ
2
n2t+i
)]
,
subject to the budget constraint
pc,tct
pt
+
px,txt
pt
+
mt
pt
≤ wtnt +Πt + tt +
mt−1
pt
+ rtk,
and the law of motion for the stock of durable goods
dt = xt + (1− δ)dt−1, (2.2)
where wt, Πt, tt, and rt are the real wage, the real dividend income from owning
intermediate firms, real lump-sum transfers, and the real rental price of capital, re-
spectively; mt is nominal money balances; pt is the GDP deflator; and pc,t (px,t) is
39
the price index of the composite nondurable (durable) good. Regarding the param-
eters, δ > 0 is the rate of depreciation of the stock of durable goods, 0 < β < 1 is
the discount factor, ψc > 0 and ψd > 0 are the weights of nondurable and durable
goods in the subutility, and φ > 0 measures the disutility from labor.4
Let λt and µt be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints
above. The first order conditions to the household’s problem are then
ψcc
−1
t =
λtpc,t
pt
, (2.3)
µt = ψdd
−1
t + β(1− δ)Et[µt+1], (2.4)
φnt = λtwt, (2.5)
λtpx,t
pt
= µt. (2.6)
2.3.2 Firms
Within both sectors, there are perfectly competitive final good producers and mo-
nopolistically competitive intermediate good producers. Because the structure of
production is symmetric across sectors, below we use a generic letter, j = c, x, to
denote any of the sectors.
The production technology for the final good jt is given by
jt =
[∫ 1
0
jt(i)
ǫ−1
ǫ di
] ǫ
ǫ−1
, (2.7)
where jt(i) is a differentiated intermediate good. The elasticity of substitution
among intermediate goods, ǫ > 1, is assumed to be the same in both sectors.
Denoting the price of good i in sector j by pj,t(i), profit maximization of final
4The felicity ψc ln ct+ψd ln dt − φ2n
2
t implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between durable and nondurable consumption, and the
Frisch labor supply elasticity equal one.
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good producers implies the demand function
jt(i) =
(
pj,t(i)
pj,t
)−ǫ
jt. (2.8)
Together with eq. 2.8, zero profits of final goods producers imply the sectoral
price index
pj,t =
[∫ 1
0
pj,t(i)
1−ǫdi
] 1
1−ǫ
. (2.9)
The production technology for an intermediate good is given by
jt(i) = kj,t(i)
αnj,t(i)
1−α, (2.10)
where kj,t(i) and nj,t(i) are the capital and labor services hired by firm i operating
in sector j. Prices are set a la Calvo (1983). Specifically, each period, only a
1 − θj fraction of intermediate good producers can reset their prices. Then profit
maximization implies the demands for labor and capital services
wt = (1− α)
jt(i)
nj,t(i)
mct, (2.11)
rt = α
jt(i)
kj,t(i)
mct, (2.12)
and the optimal price of good i
p∗j,t(i) =
ǫ
ǫ− 1
∑∞
s=0(θjβ)
sEt[λt+sp
ǫ
j,t+sjt+smct+s]∑∞
s=0(θjβ)
sEt[λt+spǫj,t+sjt+sp
−1
t+s]
, (2.13)
where mct is the real marginal cost. Note that the real marginal cost is the same
in both sectors. This stems from the Cobb-Douglas production function and the
perfect mobility of production factors.
Because of symmetry across intermediate firms within each sector, intermedi-
ate firms who can reset their prices set the same price. And because only a 1− θj
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fraction of prices can be reset every period, and, thus, the remaining fraction re-
mains unchanged, the sectoral price index, eq. 2.9, is now read
p1−ǫj,t = θjp
1−ǫ
j,t−1 + (1− θj)p
∗1−ǫ
j,t . (2.14)
2.3.3 Aggregation, Real GDP, and Money
At any point in time, production factors can be divided between the durable and
nondurable sectors according to
nt = nc,t + nx,t, (2.15)
k = kc,t + kx,t, (2.16)
where nc,t and kc,t (nx,t and kx,t) are labor and capital hired in the nondurable
(durable) sector. Market clearing impliesnj,t =
∫ 1
0
nj,t(i)di and kj,t =
∫ 1
0
kj,t(i)di
for j = c, x.
Real GDP, yt, is defined by using the steady state values of the sectoral price
indices in nominal GDP
yt ≡ p¯cct + p¯xxt. (2.17)
Hence the GDP deflator is obtained by
pt =
pc,tct + px,txt
yt
. (2.18)
The demand for money is motivated simply by assuming that it is proportional
to nominal GDP
mt = ptyt. (2.19)
Any difference in money supply from one period to the next is distributed to the
household through lump-sum transfers pttt = mt −mt−1. And the (log) growth
rate of money supply is simply a mean zero i.i.d. random variable:
ln
mt
mt−1
= εt. (2.20)
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2.4 Real Wage Rigidities
In our model with real wage rigidities, the real wage differs from the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure – i.e., eq. 2.5 does not hold.
To model real wage rigidities, we follow Blanchard and Galı´ (2007) ad hoc but
parsimonious formulation. Namely, we assume that the (log) real wage for which
the household members are willing to work is a weighted sum of the lagged (log)
real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
lnwt = γ lnwt−1 + (1− γ) lnmrst, (2.21)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 measures the degree of real wage rigidities in the economy,
and mrst is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure,
mrst ≡
φnt
λt
= px,tφnt
ptµt
. That is, to obtain our model, we replace eq. 2.5 in the
standard model with eq. 2.21.
Next we analytically assess the role of real wage rigidities in the comovement
problem arising under flexibly priced durable goods. Following the neat analy-
sis of Barsky et al. (2007) we display a crucial property of the shadow value of
durable goods: µt is nearly invariant. To this end, we rewrite eq. 2.4 as
µt = ψdEt
[
∞∑
i=0
(β(1− δ))id−1t+i
]
.
Two remarks are in order about the shadow value of durable goods. First, the last
equation states that the shadow value of durable goods is the expected sum of the
discounted value of marginal utilities of durable goods. With low values of δ, tem-
porary changes in the marginal utility of durable goods have insignificant effects
on their shadow value. Second, because the stock-flow ratio of durable goods is
high (d/x = 1/δ in the steady state), the effect of purchases of durable goods on
the stock is also insignificant. These two properties justify treating the shadow
value of durable goods as constant in our analytical exposition (i.e., µt ≈ µ).
To continue with our analysis of the role of real wage rigidities, we first rewrite
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eq. 2.21 as
(
w
1/γ
t
wt−1
) γ
1−γ
= mrst =
px,tφnt
ptµt
. To substitute px,t/pt out from the last
expression, recall that durable-goods’ prices are flexible, and that the capital-labor
ratio is common to all firms, implying xpx,t
pt
= ǫ
ǫ−1
mct =
ǫ
ǫ−1
wt
(1−α)
(
nt
k
)α
. This
together with µt ≈ µ enable us to rewrite eq. 2.21 as
(
wt
wt−1
) γ
1−γ
≈
ǫφk−α
(ǫ− 1)(1− α)µ
n1+αt . (2.22)
It is now easy to see that in the standard model, i.e., γ = 0, the only solution
to eq. 2.22 is invariant aggregate employment. Also, because nt = nc,t + nx,t,
positive comovement between sectoral employment levels is impossible. But if
γ > 0, aggregate employment moves in the direction of the change in the real
wage, and sectoral employment levels may move together. The economic intu-
ition is straightforward. Once the real wage is rigid, marginal costs, common to
all sectors, become less sensitive to changes in aggregate demand. This, in turn,
limits the extent to which prices in both sectors react to changes in aggregate de-
mand, rendering it possible for the output in both sectors to move together.
To confirm these results and to provide further details, next we report the
results of our numerical simulations, using the log-linear approximation to the
model around the nonstochastic steady state.
2.5 Numerical Simulations
2.5.1 Calibration
We start by calibrating the parameters. Our choice of parameter values is the same
made by Barsky et al. (2007), except that we calibrate our model to quarterly data.
Table 3.1 summarizes our choice of parameters targeting the following steady state
values. Namely we set an annual discount rate of 2% implying β = 0.9951. We
set an annual depreciation rate of 5% implying δ = 0.0123. We set the shares of
sectoral outputs in GDP such that in the steady state the output of the nondurable
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Table 2.1: Benchmark Parameters
Discount factor: β = 1.02−1/4
Rate of depreciation: δ = 1.051/4 − 1
Relative weight in subutility: ψc/ψd = 3δ/(1− β(1− δ))
Capital share: α = 0.35
Degree of price stickiness
in the nondurable sector: θc = 0.6534
in the durable sector: θx = 0
Degree of real wage rigidities: γ = 0.9546
sector is thrice that of the durable sector implying ψc/ψd = 2.1467. We set a
capital share of 35% implying α = 0.35.
As a benchmark, we set an half-life of two quarters for nominal stickiness
in the nondurable sector implying θc = 0.6534. The comovement and aggregate
neutrality problems are immense when durable-goods’ prices are flexible. For this
reason we set θx = 0. Yet, in Section 2.5.2 we also consider a wide range of val-
ues for θc and θx. The parameters φ and ǫ do not play any role in the log-linear
model.
In all our experiments, we study the response of key macroeconomic aggre-
gates to a permanent increase in money supply: The growth rate of money supply,
εt, assumes 0.01 at t = 1 and zero thereafter. Thus the monetary shock expands
the money supply once-and-for-all by 1%.
We are not aware of a direct empirical evidence for the parameter governing
the degree of real wage rigidities. In the literature, the values assumed range from
0.5 to 1. Blanchard and Galı´ (2007) set γ = 0.9 in their baseline calibration and
also experiment both with γ = 0.8 and γ = 0.5. Duval and Vogel (2007) exper-
iment with γ = 0.79 and γ = 0.93. Shimer (2012a) assumes that the real wage
rate is constant in business cycle frequencies, implying γ = 1. To set a benchmark
value for γ, we target the standard deviation of US GDP in a version of our model
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that also allows for total factor productivity shocks. To produce a standard devia-
tion of GDP of 1.72%, we choose γ = 0.9546.5 Because this parameter is key to
our discussion, we start by assuming not a single value but a range: γ ∈ [0, 1].
2.5.2 Results
The Role of γ
First we study how the degree of real wage rigidities, γ, affects the responses of
four selected variables –GDP, the real wage, durables output, nondurables output–
to a permanent 1% increase in money supply.6 To this end, we compute the first
quarter and the first year (quarterly averaged) responses of these four variables for
γ ∈ [0, 1] with a grid of 0.01. Figure 2.2 illustrates the two measures as a function
of γ (first quarter as solid line; first year as dashed line).
Eyeballing the graphs related to GDP and the two sectors’ outputs, we observe
that as γ increases, both problems, aggregate neutrality and negative sectoral co-
movement, cease to exist. Simultaneously, the first quarter and the first year re-
sponses of the relative real wage approach empirically plausible values.
5Specifically, we assume that the production technology for an intermediate good is given
by jt(i) = atkj,t(i)αnj,t(i)1−α, where at is total factor productivity and follows log(at) =
0.95 log(at−1) + νa,t. The growth rate of money supply, εt, follows log(εt) = 0.49 log(εt−1) +
νm,t. The innovations νm,t and νa,t are mean zero i.i.d. random variables with standard deviations
of 0.89% and 0.7%. The correlation between the innovations is set to zero. The smoothing param-
eter of the Hodrick-Prescott filter is set to 1600. Accordingly, 85% of the deviation in output are
due to shocks to total factor productivity.
6For the sake of brevity, we select only four variables. We select GDP to address aggregate
neutrality; we select the sectoral outputs to address the comovement problem; and we select the
relative real wage to address real wage rigidities.
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Figure 2.2: The Role of Real Wage Rigidities
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Note: The horizontal axis measures the degree of real wage rigidities, γ ∈ [0, 1]. The vertical axis measures
the impact (solid line) and first year quarterly average (dashed line) responses to a permanent monetary
expansion. The rest of the parameters assume their benchmark values.
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The response of GDP is always positive and increasing in γ. More specif-
ically, the first year response starts increasing at a faster rate around γ = 0.8;
for γ ∈ [0.8, 1] aggregate non-neutrality is significant. The interval γ ∈ [0.8, 1]
also suffices to generate positive comovement between the sectoral outputs at first
quarter responses. Regarding first year responses, the threshold value of γ gen-
erating positive comovement between sectoral outputs is 0.93. In the standard
model, i.e., when γ = 0, the first quarter response of the real wage is 70 times
higher than that of aggregate output. By contrast, the response of the relative real
wage decreases in γ as implied by the law of motion of the real wage, eq. 2.21.
With our baseline calibration, γ = 0.9546, the first quarter response of the real
wage is 10% of that of aggregate output.
Impulse Response Functions
To gain further intuition, in Figure 3.2 we contrast the standard model (γ = 0;
solid line) with the model with real wage rigidities (γ = 0.9546; dashed line) in
terms of impulse response functions. Again, the innovation is a permanent 1%
increase in money supply, and durable-goods’ prices are flexible.
In both models, the impulse response functions for the durable sector illustrate
that the reaction of the output is the mirror image of that of the price index. The
contrast is primarily on impact effects. In the model with real wage rigidities,
the durable-price index, on impact, undershoots its long-run value by 0.2%. In
the standard model, however, it overshoots by 1.5%. Because of these temporary
changes in prices, in the standard model durables output decreases on impact by
5%, while with real wage rigidities it increases by 0.85%. Thus the most striking
aspect of incorporating real wage rigidities into the standard model is the reversal
of the durable-output response: The household switches expenditure from non-
durable to durable goods. This switch in expenditure also attenuates the impact
response of nondurables output and price index.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions
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in the standard model, γ = 0, while the dashed lines represent the responses in the model with real wage
rigidities, γ = 0.9546. The rest of the parameters assume their benchmark values.
49
Obviously, the key variable to understand the under- and overshooting of the
durable-price indices, and, thus, the reversal of the durable-output response, is the
reaction of the real wage. In the model with real wage rigidities, the response of
the real wage is muted, being in line with the empirical evidence documented in
VAR studies (see, for example, Altig et al. 2011, Amato and Laubach 2003, and
Christiano et al. 2005). With real wage rigidities, thanks to this muted response
of the real wage, the durable-price index can under-shoot its long-run value, al-
lowing the durable-output to react positively on impact to monetary expansions.
In the standard model, because the sectoral outputs move in opposite direc-
tions, GDP, which is the weighted average of the sectoral outputs, is essentially
unchanged. In the model with real wage rigidities, the responses of the sectoral
outputs increase simultaneously, and, thus, the response of GDP increases as well.
In short, with real wage rigidities, we obtain non-neutral money and positive co-
movement between sectoral outputs.
Ordering the magnitudes of peak-responses of the sectoral variables and GDP
reveals that in the model with real wage rigidities: (i) Durables output reacts
sharply to monetary shocks; (ii) GDP and nondurables output react similarly and
less dramatically than durables output; (iii) The durable-price index reacts more
strongly than the nondurable-price index. These three results are also in line with
the stylized facts documented in Barsky et al. (2003), Erceg and Levin (2006), and
Monacelli (2009).
The Roles of θc and θx
As in the majority of the related literature, in our evaluation so far we have only
considered the case of flexibly priced durable goods.7 In their survey of the micro-
price studies analyzing data that underlie U.S. consumer and producer price in-
dices, Klenow and Malin (2010) document that while price flexibility increases
7See Bouakez et al. (2011), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010), and Sudo (2012). Bouakez et al.
experiment also with an half life of one month for nominal stickiness in the durable sector.
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with durability, durable-goods’ prices, on average, are not perfectly flexible.
To detect how the imperfect flexibility of durable-goods’ prices affects the na-
ture of comovement in both models we evaluate, we first compute the first-year
effects of a permanent increase in money supply on nondurables and durables out-
puts for all possible combinations of ten equally distanced values of θc and θx in
the range [0.1, 0.9]. To produce a basic summary statistic of sectoral comovement,
we, then, compute the ratio of the first year multiplier of nondurables output to that
of durables output; positive and negative values implying positive and negative
comovement, respectively. Focusing only on the cases in which durable-goods’
prices are more flexible than the nondurable-goods’ prices, θx ≤ θc, Table 3.2
presents how our summary statistic changes with the sectoral price flexibility in
the standard model (Panel A) and in the model with real wage rigidities (Panel B).8
In Table 3.2, we use bold-faced type to highlight the cases in which the statistic
falls into the empirically plausible range of [10%, 50%] (Barsky et al. 2003, Erceg
and Levin 2006, and Monacelli (2009)).
Regarding the standard model, from Panel A of Table 3.2 we observe that in
30 of all 36 cases considered we obtain negative comovement. In two cases we
obtain positive comovement but the effect on the nondurable-output exceeds that
on the durable-output. Only in four cases our statistic lies within the empirically
plausible range. Regarding the model with real wage rigidities, from Panel B of
Table 3.2 we observe that in all cases we obtain positive comovement, and the
response of the nondurables-output is less than that of the durable-output. In 21
cases, the statistic lies within the empirically plausible range.
Thus, Table 3.2 confirms our previous argument that in the model with real
wage rigidities the comovement problem disappears as long as durable-goods’
prices are more flexible than nondurable-goods’ prices.
8In the cases of equal flexibility, θx = θc, for the two models considered, the statistic ranges
between 0.009 and 0.035 implying the lack of sectoral comovement. In the cases of extra flexibility
in the nondurable-goods’ prices, θx > θc, again for the two models considered, the statistic ranges
between −0.020 and −0.199 implying negative comovement.
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Table 2.2: Sectoral Comovement & Price Stickiness
Panel A: Standard Model (γ = 0)
θc = 0.2 θc = 0.3 θc = 0.4 θc = 0.5 θc = 0.6 θc = 0.7 θc = 0.8 θc = 0.9
θx = 0.1 −0.746 −0.458 −0.405 −0.383 −0.372 −0.365 −0.361 −0.363
θx = 0.2 −6.730 −0.613 −0.468 −0.419 −0.396 −0.383 −0.380
θx = 0.3 1.319 −0.833 −0.534 −0.454 −0.419 −0.405
θx = 0.4 0.679 −1.183 −0.609 −0.492 −0.449
θx = 0.5 0.479 −1.920 −0.701 −0.542
θx = 0.6 0.374 −5.112 −0.850
θx = 0.7 0.305 4.956
θx = 0.8 0.245
Panel B: The Model with Real Wage Rigidities (γ = 0.9546)
θc = 0.2 θc = 0.3 θc = 0.4 θc = 0.5 θc = 0.6 θc = 0.7 θc = 0.8 θc = 0.9
θx = 0.1 0.252 0.496 0.699 0.833 0.896 0.896 0.838 0.689
θx = 0.2 0.145 0.291 0.431 0.548 0.626 0.650 0.581
θx = 0.3 0.110 0.220 0.331 0.427 0.490 0.477
θx = 0.4 0.093 0.185 0.278 0.355 0.379
θx = 0.5 0.083 0.164 0.242 0.287
θx = 0.6 0.078 0.149 0.204
θx = 0.7 0.074 0.132
θx = 0.8 0.071
Note: The table gives the ratio of first year multiplier of nondurables output to that of
durables output. A negative value implies negative sectoral comovement. Bold-faced
type is used to highlight the cases in which the ratio falls into the empirically plausible
range: [10%, 50%].
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we argue that real wage rigidities are a missing element in the
standard two sector New Keynesian model. In the standard model, for aggre-
gate output to increase following a monetary shock, durable-goods’ prices must
be sticky. If durable-goods’ prices are flexible, and nondurable-goods’ prices are
sticky, then the standard model predicts negative sectoral comovement besides ag-
gregate neutrality. If both durable- and nondurable-goods’ prices are sticky, then
the standard model predicts no sectoral comovement. By incorporating real wage
rigidities into the standard model, we obtain positive sectoral comovement and,
thus, aggregate non-neutrality as long as durable-goods’ prices are more flexible
than nondurable-goods’ prices.
Real wage rigidities have been advocated as a missing element also in other
contexts (Blanchard and Galı´ 2007, Hall 2005b, and Shimer (2012a) 2012a, just
to name a few recent examples). Our research thus justifies our agreement with
Shimer (2012a) that wage rigidities should be put back into the center of research
on macroeconomics. This chapter is a contribution to that program.
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Chapter 3
A New Perspective on the
Unemployment Volatility Puzzle
Figure 3.1: Unemployment and Output
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Note: Quarterly data (1951:1–2012:4), in logs, filtered using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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3.1 Introduction
Figure 3.1 displays postwar US output and unemployment rate in logs detrended
with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Clearly, unemployment oscillates more than out-
put: The standard deviation of unemployment is nine times higher than that of
output. But the canonical search and matching model, the workhorse model of
the labor market, generates a standard deviation of unemployment lower than that
of output (Shimer, 2005). Motivated by this unemployment volatility puzzle, in a
novel way, we introduce unemployment into a real business cycle (RBC) model.
Our model generates a standard deviation of unemployment (and output) in line
with data.
We study unemployment oscillations in a model where workers differ in their
skills and firms love variety of workers’ skills. In this extension of an RBC model,
unemployment emerges because of two reasons: (i) as the job separation rate plays
a minor role in US unemployment oscillations (Hall (2005a) and Shimer (2012a)),
we follow much of the search and matching literature and assume that a constant
share of employed workers lose their jobs every period; and (ii) we assume that
job creation is costly.
The costs of job creation are supported by the household: Each period, the
household decides the number of workers that are coordinated with firms. By
creating jobs, households benefit in two ways. Firstly, a new job implies that an
additional worker is employed and generates labor income. Secondly, because
workers differ in their skills, the household exploits monopolistic profits from
each employed worker by setting a markup over the marginal rate of substitution
of consumption for leisure. The household creates jobs until it balances the costs
and benefits of job creation.
Our model generates highly volatile unemployment. A positive productivity
shock increases wages because of labor demand pressure. In our model, because
the households create jobs, higher wages increase the incentives for job creation:
the household exploits a larger economic surplus of creating an additional job
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after a positive productivity shock. As a result, job creation and unemployment
volatility increase. This is not the case in search and matching models. In these
models, the increase of wages in the aftermath of a positive productivity shock
discourages firms to create jobs, thus generating lower unemployment volatility.
Our model has an additional endogenous amplification mechanism. In equilib-
rium, our model exhibits increasing returns to scale to specialization: intuitively,
a higher employment rate enables workers to specialize in specific tasks that are
specific to their skills, enhancing productivity. Thus, when in the aftermath of a
positive productivity shock, employment increases, firms have further incentives
to hire workers. This amplifies the effects explained above: it increases upward
pressure in wages, further motivating households to create jobs.
Our model also outperforms the canonical RBC model, and solves two of its
main problems: the lack of output volatility and the lack of output persistence
(King and Rebelo (1999)). The high unemployment volatility generated by our
model propagates to output, increasing output volatility. This is achieved even
without a Frisch elasticity inconsistent with micro studies.1 Our extension of an
RBC model is also able to increase persistence of output: even after 25 years past
a productivity shock, the shock still has visible effects on output; yet, in the canon-
ical RBC model, the shock has a neglectable effect 20 years past its emergence.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we review the literature
on the unemployment volatility puzzle. We proeceed with Section 3.3 by show-
ing our modeling assumptions and with Section 3.4 by calibrating our model. In
Section 3.5, we show how our model solves the unemployment volatility puzzle,
and how it outperforms the canonical RBC model for both output’s volatility and
persistence. In Section 3.6, we conclude.
1For more details on the difference between micro and macro labor supply elasticities, see
Chetty et al. (2011).
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3.2 The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle Literature
Shimer (2005) shows that the unemployment volatility in the canonical search and
matching model is 20 times smaller than in data (18 times smaller in the search
and matching model used in this chapter). The difference in results between our
model and search and matching models reflect differences in the job creation pro-
cess. In the canonical search and matching model, unemployed workers search
for jobs every period, while firms open vacancies. Opening vacancies is costly:
Firms contrast the expected value of a vacancy –which depends on the value of a
filled job and the likelihood of filling a vacancy– with its costs. Furthermore, a
matching function determines the number of matches. This matching function is
homogeneous of degree one and concave, and determines the number of matches
as a function of unemployed workers and vacancies. A job is created if, upon
meeting, both worker and firm agree on a wage.
The unemployment volatility puzzle of search and matching models results
from (i) the interaction of congestion externalities (concave matching function)
with vacancy posting costs and from (ii) the wage setting mechanism. A positive
productivity shock induces firms to open more vacancies. But, as the number of
vacancies increases, it is harder to fill each vacancy and, thus, more costly to hire
a worker. At the same time, because an unemployed worker can more easily find
a job, wages increase. These two effects together pin down the effect of higher
labor productivity on unemployment.
Many researchers, all remaining in the framework of search and matching
models, have tried to solve the unemployment volatility puzzle. Hall (2005b) and
Shimer (2004) advocate that real wage rigidities can help solve the unemployment
volatility puzzle by removing the effect of productivity shocks on wages. Hall and
Milgrom (2008) advocate an alternative wage bargain with a threat to keep bar-
gaining next period. With this assumption, wages become less sensitive to market
conditions.
Solutions advocating real wage rigidity, however, have been criticised on em-
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pirical grounds. In search and matching models, job creation is determined by the
wage of new hires. And Pissarides (2009), Haefke et al. (2008), and Carneiro et al.
(2012) found no evidence that the wages of new hires are rigid; they concluded
that the wages of new hires are as cyclical as labor productivity.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), on the other hand, advocate changes to the
conventional calibration of search and matching models. They advocate that the
workers’ bargaining power and the workers’ surplus achieved by moving from
unemployment to employment should be close to null. This calibration strategy
implies a lower firms’ surplus of hiring a new worker, increasing the sensitiv-
ity (in percentage terms) to productivity. Although this calibration strategy does
increase the volatility of the canonical search and matching model, it has also
been criticised on the empirical validity of their assumptions: Costain and Reiter
(2008) show that by simply calibrating the canonical search and matching model,
it is impossible to obtain both a reasonable response to productivity shocks and
a reasonable response to policy variables. Thus, by obtaining one, Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) neglect the other.
In this chapter, we do not try to build a search and matching model without
an unemployment volatility problem. Instead, we propose an alternative method
to model unemployment in an RBC model. And, in particular, we propose an
alternative model that has a behavior consistent with data for two main variables:
unemployment and output.
3.3 The Model
Our model is a simple extension of an RBC model. There are two agents in our
model, firms and households. Firms produce the final good by employing capital,
kt, and a labor composite of all available labor types, lt. Households consume
the final good, rent capital, and supply labor. The labor supply in our model
differs from the canonical RBC model. In the canonical RBC model, workers
are homogeneous and the household only supplies labor through the intensive
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margin of labor. In our model, households supply workers with differentiated
skills and through both the intensive and extensive margins of labor. Each period,
the household decides hours per worker and the number of new jobs, xt. The
number of new jobs is determined by the costs of job creation and by the economic
benefits of employing an additional worker. It is used as a control variable for
employment, nt, which follows the law of motion
nt = (1− δn)nt−1 + xt, (3.1)
where δ is a constant fraction of jobs that are exogenously destroyed each period.
3.3.1 Representative Firm
Firms produce the final good, which can be used for consumption, investment,
and the costs of job creation. To produce the final good, firms combine capital
and labor in the form
yt = atk
α
t l
1−α
t , (3.2)
where α is the capital share, and at is a common productivity factor. The labor
input, lt, is a composite of hours per worker,
lt =
[∫
j∈J
ht(j)
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
. (3.3)
Each worker j supplies a differentiated skill, and if employed, works ht(j) hours.
Because of unemployment, at any given time t, only a subset of all labor types,
J , is available. We denote this subset by Jt ⊂ J . Finally, the parameter θ > 0
governs the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor types.
The first order conditions to the firm’s cost minimization problem are
rt = αyt/kt, (3.4)
wt = (1− α)yt/lt, (3.5)
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wt =
[∫
j∈Jt
wt(j)
1−θdj
] 1
1−θ
, (3.6)
ht(j) =
(
wt(j)
wt
)−θ
lt, (3.7)
where rt is the rental rate of capital; wt is the aggregate hourly wage; and wt(j) is
the hourly wage for the labor services of the worker j. These first order conditions
are similar to the ones of RBC models extended with worker’s differentiated skills
(e.g. Chari et al. (2007)). The only difference lies on the fact that our model
features unemployment, whereas other models assume full employment.
3.3.2 Representative Household
Households own the firms. Each household is composed of a large number of
members of total measure unity who are all willing to work.2 But, because of
unemployment, a fraction nt is employed and a fraction ut = 1 − nt is unem-
ployed. We follow Merz (1995) and assume that the household completely in-
sures its members against employment risk, implying that members equally share
consumption.
The household decides the number of jobs created each period, xt. Job cre-
ation is an investment: It implies a cost at the time jobs are created, φ(1 + 1
2
xt),
but it also generates income in the following periods, wt(j)ht(j). The only differ-
ence with respect to capital investment is that job creation has a direct effect on
the disutility of labor, ht(j)
1+ψ−1
1+ψ−1
.
We incorporate these changes to an otherwise standard household’s problem:
max
ct,ht,kt+1,nt,xt,wt(j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

ln ct −
nt∫
0
χ
ht(j)
1+ψ−1
1 + ψ−1
dj


2Given our focus on the U.S. business cycle fluctuations, and the lack of cyclicality in the U.S.
labor force, this assumption do not compromise our results (Rogerson and Shimer, 2011).
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subject to the budget constraint, labor demand, and the law of motion of employ-
ment
nt∫
0
wt(j)ht(j)dj + (rt + (1− δk))kt ≥ ct + kt+1 + φ
(
xt +
1
2
x2t
)
,
ht(j) ≥
(
wt(j)
wt
)−θ
lt,
nt ≤ (1− δn)nt−1 + xt,
where β is the discount factor; χ is a measure of the disutility of labor; ψ is the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply; δk is the capital depreciation rate; and φ is a scale
parameter of the costs of job creation.
We anticipate symmetric equilibrium across labor types: All employed work-
ers work the same number of hours, ht, and earn the same wage, wht . Then, the
first order conditions are
wht =
θ
θ − 1
χhψ
−1
t ct, (3.8)
1 = βEt
[
ct
ct+1
(1− δk + rt+1)
]
, (3.9)
φ(1 + xt) =
θ + ψ
θ(ψ + 1)
htw
h
t + β(1− δn)Et
[
ct
ct+1
φ(1 + xt+1)
]
. (3.10)
The first two equations are the same as in RBC models extended with worker’s
differentiated skills: Households set a constant mark-up over the marginal rate of
substitution of consumption for labor, and invest in capital until they are indiffer-
ent between consuming one unit this period or investing and consuming it next
period. The third equation, however, is one of the novelties of this chapter. It is
the job creation equation: The marginal cost of creating a job must equal the sum
of (i) the marginal gain of an additional employed worker for the household in
consumption units and (ii) the continuation value of employment.
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3.3.3 Symmetric Equilibrium and Aggregation
In a symmetric equilibrium, Eqs. 3.3 and 3.6 imply3
lt = htn
θ
θ−1
t , (3.11)
wt = w
h
t n
1
1−θ
t . (3.12)
These two equations are not standard in the RBC literature: The labor composite
is not a linear function of employment, as well as the wage index is not equal to
the hourly wage. But they are a natural result of two assumptions of our model.
They result from the assumption of firms love-for-variety of skills and from the
existence of unemployment. These assumptions generate increasing returns to
scale in the form of labor division: As more workers are employed, the ability to
distribute tasks that fit each skill is enhanced leading to higher productivity.4
Another aggregate consistency condition is the resource constraint:
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + φ
(
xt +
1
2
x2t
)
. (3.13)
This equation states that final good production is devoted to consumption, invest-
ment, and costs of job creation. A competitive equilibrium for this economy is
thus described by a set of allocations ct, ht, kt, lt, nt, xt, yt, prices rt, wt, wht , and
common productivity factor at satisfying equations 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.8-3.13,
given an exogenous process for the common productivity factor
log(at) = ρ log(at−1) + εt, (3.14)
and the initial condition for employment, capital, and productivity: n−1, k−1 and
a−1. εt is an i.i.d disturbance with mean zero.
3For details on how to obtain these two equations see Melitz (2003).
4Our results, however, are not only driven by increasing returns to scale.
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Table 3.1: Benchmark Parameters
Discount factor: β = 0.99
Rate of depreciation: δk = 1.11/4 − 1
Rate of separation: δn = 0.1
Elasticity of substitution: θ = 6
Frisch elasticity: ψ = 1
Capital share: α = 0.36
Weight in utility: χ = 0.8896
Cost parameters:
φ = 1.8997
γ = 2
Persistence of tech: ρ = 0.95
Std of tech shock: ε = 0.0072
3.4 Calibration
Our model is highly nonlinear. To proceed with the analysis, we log-linearize
the model around the steady-state and calibrate it. We calibrate our model to the
U.S. economy and summarize our calibration in Table 3.1. We set each period
t as a quarter. Accordingly, we follow much of the business cycle literature and
set β = 0.99, δk = 0.025, α = 0.36, ρ = 0.979, and var(ε) = 0.0072. We set
δn = 0.1 to be consistent with the large flows out of employment in U.S. data. The
choice over the Frisch labor supply elasticity, ψ, is controversial. Nevertheless,
as this discussion goes beyond the scope of this chapter, we set ψ = 1 in our
benchmark calibration, and assess the role of ψ in our sensitivity analysis. We
follow the same strategy for θ and set θ = 6 in our benchmark calibration. Finally,
we use φ and χ to target a steady-state unemployment rate of 6% (approximately
the unemployment rate in the U.S. in the postwar period) and to normalize hours
worked to one.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Second moments
In Table 3.2, we contrast the business cycle statistics of eight key macroeconomic
variables estimated using U.S. data, with the ones generated by our model, by a
search and matching model, and by an RBC model. The U.S. data we use starts
at 1951:1 and ends at 2012:4.5 To generate the results of the three models, we
assume that productivity shocks are the only driver of business cycles.6 To pro-
duce all business cycle statistics, we use a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing
parameter of 1600.
We conclude from Table 3.2 that our model delivers business cycle statistics
close to the ones observed in the US economy. We also conclude that our model
outperforms its two competitors in replicating US data. If we first consider unem-
ployment, we confirm the unemployment volatility puzzle of search and matching
models: In data, the standard deviation of unemployment is 13.10, whereas the
search and matching model generates a standard deviation of 0.71. Our model,
on the other hand, generates a standard deviation of unemployment of 12.43, very
close to its data counterpart.
The unemployment volatility puzzle of search and matching models, first doc-
umented by Shimer (2005), results from (i) the interaction of congestion exter-
nalities (concave matching function) with vacancy posting costs and from (ii) the
wage setting mechanism. A positive productivity shock induces firms to open
more vacancies. But the decrease in the vacancy filling ratio and the increase
in wages pin down the effect of higher labor productivity on unemployment. Our
model, however, does not have an unemployment volatility problem. Eq. 3.10 im-
plies that an increase in wages encourages the households to create more jobs, thus
5GDP, consumption, and investment are real and in per capita terms. Wages refer to the non-
farm real compensation per hour. Consumption comprises both nondurables spending and ser-
vices. Investment comprises both investment and durables spending. The data are from the Federal
Reserve Economic Data.
6The two models are detailed in the appendix as well as the calibrations we used to obtain the
results reported in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Selected Moments
A. Standard Deviations
y u n h nh w(z) i c
US Data (1951:1–2012:4) 1.51 13.10 0.84 0.52 1.75 0.89 6.17 0.85
Benchmark Model 1.53 12.43 0.76 0.40 0.90 0.66 2.65 0.43
Search Model 1.23 0.71 0.04 0.43 0.46 0.78 3.81 0.39
RBC Model 1.22 – – – 0.44 0.79 3.83 0.39
B. Relative Standard Deviations
y u n h nh w(z) i c
US Data (1951:1–2012:4) 1.00 8.68 0.56 0.35 1.16 0.59 4.09 0.56
Benchmark Model 1.00 8.11 0.50 0.26 0.59 0.43 1.73 0.28
Search Model 1.00 0.57 0.04 0.35 0.37 0.64 3.09 0.32
RBC Model 1.00 – – – 0.36 0.65 3.13 0.32
C. Cross Correlations
y u n h nh w(z) i c
US Data (1951:1–2012:4) 1.00 -0.79 0.80 0.71 0.84 0.17 0.88 0.75
Benchmark Model 1.00 -0.82 0.82 0.66 0.98 0.97 0.78 0.88
Search Model 1.00 -0.88 0.88 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.90
RBC Model 1.00 – – – 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.90
D. Autocorrelations
y u n h nh w(z) i c
US Data (1951:1–2012:4) 0.81 0.89 0.90 0.81 0.89 0.73 0.84 0.78
Benchmark Model 0.77 0.93 0.93 0.70 0.84 0.65 0.94 0.82
Search Model 0.73 0.25 0.25 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.80
RBC Model 0.72 – – – 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.80
Note: This table shows the standard deviation, relative (to output) standard deviation,
cross correlation with output, and autocorrelation of 8 variables of interest in data, our
model, search and matching model, and RBC model. The variables of interest are out-
put, unemployment, employment, hours per worker, total hours, wage, investment, and
consumption.
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increasing the sensitivity of unemployment to productivity shocks. Furthermore,
firms’ love for variety of skills generates increasing returns to scale in equilibrium
which further contributes to higher volatility in our model.
Our extension of an RBC model contributes to solving one of the canonical
RBC model’s main problems: The lack of output volatility (see King and Rebelo
(1999)). If we contrast the standard deviation of GDP generated by our model
and generated by its competitors, we easily conclude that our model does a better
a job in replicating US data: The volatility of GDP in our model is 1.53, close
to 1.51 in data, and far above the volatility of GDP generated by the RBC model
and by the search and matching model, 1.22 and 1.23. This is the case because
the high unemployment volatility in our model amplifies the effect of productivity
shocks on GDP. As for the volatility of total hours (other of the canonical RBC’s
main problems), our model, although not completely satisfying, does a better job
in generating higher volatility: Our model generates about half of the volatility in
total hours we observe in data. For the remaining variables, our model does a fair
job even though it generates a smaller volatility for investment, partly due to the
two types of investment in our model.
The models generate similar cross correlations with output. The exception is
for the case of hours per worker. In our model, the cross correlation of hours per
worker and output is below its data counterpart, while in the search and match-
ing model it is above. Regarding autocorrelations, except for wages per hour, our
model generates more persistence of the effects of productivity shocks. This is
particularly the case for the persistence of GDP, for which our model generates a
auto-correlation of 0.77 close to 0.81 in data. Our model also generates more rea-
sonable autocorrelations for unemployment and employment than the search and
matching model. For these two variables, the search and matching model gener-
ates a staggering 0.25 autocorrelation, way below 0.88 and 0.89 (respectively) in
data.7
7This only holds with quarterly calibration. With monthly calibration, standard in the search
and matching literature, the autocorrelation of unemployment and employment in the search and
matching model are close to their data counterparts.
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3.5.2 Impulse Response Functions
To gain further intuition, we proceed by contrasting the impulse response func-
tions (IRF) of our model with those of the RBC model and the search and match-
ing model (see Figure 3.2). The IRF confirm our main results from Table 3.2: In
response to a productivity shock, (i) unemployment in our model is much more
volatile than in the search and matching model, and (ii) GDP in our model has a
stronger and more persistent response than in both RBC and search and matching
models. One other interesting result is that the search and matching model and
the RBC model plots almost overlap each other: The search and matching model
is unable to amplify the effect of productivity shocks.
The response of unemployment and employment in our model is overwhelm-
ingly higher than in the search and matching model. Although unemployment
and employment do respond in the search and matching model, their response is
insignificant near the response in our model: In the figure, it is almost a flat line
over zero; our model, however, predicts that unemployment falls by 15% two and
half years after the shock. Regarding GDP, both the impact and the persistence
are higher in our model. In our model, GDP is clearly above trend even after 25
years after the productivity shock. In the RBC and search and matching models,
20 years past the productivity shock, the GDP is close to trend.
In our model, total hours increase significantly in response to the productivity
shock even though hours per worker becomes negative after one year. The re-
sponse of consumption in our model is also much higher than in the search and
matching model and in the RBC model: In our model, consumption increases by
0.8% in its peak, whereas in the two competitors it increases by about 0.4%. The
magnitude of response of wages and investment do not differ significantly across
the three models.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions
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Note: This figure plots the impulse response function of our model (full line), of the search and matching
model (dashed line), and of the RBC model (dash dot line) to a 1% productivity shock.
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3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The values assigned to some of our model’s parameters are not standard in the
literature. Therefore, we proceed with a sensitivity analysis of the results of our
model. In Table 3.3, we display the standard deviation of GDP, and the standard
deviations of the remaining seven variables relative to the one of GDP. We assess
the robustness of the results of our model to changes in the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, ψ, and in the elasticity of substitution between labor types, θ.
A staggering result of our model is that the large volatility of unemployment
relative to output is robust to changes in ψ and θ: Our model does not have an un-
employment volatility problem. The standard deviation of unemployment relative
to the standard deviation of GDP is about 8, very close to the 8.68 in US data. The
standard deviation of the remaining variables relative to the standard deviation of
GDP are also quite robust to changes in ψ and θ.
The standard deviation of output is, however, slightly sensitive to changes in
ψ and θ. In any case, it is always larger than the standard deviation of GDP in the
search and matching model and in the RBC model calibrated with the benchmark
calibration. This suggests that our model has a strong amplification mechanism
that is robust to changes in ψ and θ. Even with a small Frisch elasticity, 0.2 con-
sistent with micro studies (see Chetty et al. (2011)), our model is able to generate
a standard deviation 10% higher than the RBC model with benchmark calibration.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, our research agenda was to build a model that generates high un-
employment volatility, as we observe in US data. For that, we extended an RBC
model to feature unemployment in a novel way. In our model, workers differ in
their skills, firms love variety of skills, and households incur in costs of job cre-
ation.
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis
Relative Standard Deviations
y u n h nh wh i c
US Data (1951:1–2012:4) 1.51 8.68 0.56 0.35 1.16 0.59 4.09 0.56
Baseline Calibration 1.53 8.11 0.50 0.26 0.59 0.43 1.73 0.28
ψ = 0.2 1.32 8.04 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.58 1.81 0.28
ψ = 0.5 1.42 8.09 0.50 0.17 0.55 0.50 1.69 0.28
ψ = 4 1.78 8.05 0.49 0.43 0.68 0.33 2.19 0.28
θ = 3 1.67 8.44 0.52 0.22 0.57 0.45 1.74 0.33
θ = 25 1.46 7.97 0.49 0.27 0.59 0.43 1.80 0.27
θ = 100 1.44 7.94 0.49 0.28 0.59 0.43 1.82 0.27
Note: This table shows the sensitivity of the results of our model to changes
in the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ψ, and in the elasticity of substitution
between labor types, θ.
Our model is able to overcome the unemployment volatility problem of search
and matching models (Shimer (2005)), generating unemployment volatility con-
sistent with US data. Our model also outperforms the canonical RBC model by
solving two of its main drawbacks: lack of output volatility and lack of output
persistence (King and Rebelo (1999)).
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Appendix A
Real Business Cycle Model
In this appendix, I explain the real business cycle model used in Chapter 3.
A.1 Households
The household’s utility maximization problem is the following:
max
ct,ht,kt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ln ct+i − χ
h1+ψ
−1
t+i
1 + ψ−1
]
subject to
dt + wtht + (rt + (1− δk))kt ≥ ct + kt+1,
The first order conditions are
wt = χh
ψ−1
t ct (A.1)
1 = βEt
[
ct
ct+1
(1− δk + rt+1)
]
. (A.2)
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A.2 Firms
The representative firm produces the final good using capital and labor:
yt = atk
α
t h
1−α
t . (A.3)
Cost minimization implies
rt = αyt/kt, (A.4)
wt = (1− α)yt/ht. (A.5)
A.3 Equilibrium
To complete the model, we add the resource constraint
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt. (A.6)
A.4 Calibration
We use χ to target steady state hours: h = 1. We follow the real business cycle lit-
erature to calibrate the remaining parameters: β = 0.99, α = 0.36, δk = 1.11/4−1,
and ψ = 1. The parameters regarding the productivity shock are the same as for
the main model of Chapter 3.
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Appendix B
Search and Matching Model
In this appendix, I explain the search and matching model used in Chapter 3. We
assume that the law of motion of employment is
nt+1 = (1− δn)nt +mt, (B.1)
where mt is the number of new matches. The number of new matches is deter-
mined by a matching function which depends on two arguments, vacancies and
unemployed workers:
mt = σ(1− nt)
ηv1−ηt , (B.2)
where σ is a scale parameter; η is the elasticity of the matching function with
respect to unemployment; and vt is the number of vacancies. The job finding
probability is
f(θt) = σθ
1−η
t , (B.3)
while the job filling probability is
q(θt) = σθ
−η
t , (B.4)
where θt ≡ vt1−nt is the labor market tightness.
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B.1 Households
Let Vt denote the household’s lifetime utility. Taking as given the probability that
the household’s members find a job, the objective of the household is to choose a
path for ct that maximizes
Vt = max
{ct}
[
log ct − γnt
h1+ψt
1 + ψ
+ βEtVt+1
]
, (B.5)
subject to
ct = wtntht + Tt +Πt, (B.6)
nt+1 = (1− δn)nt + f(θt)(1− nt), (B.7)
where Πt are profits stemming from owning the firms.
The maximization problem of the household implies that profits are discounted
by
Λt+1 ≡ βEt
ct
ct+1
. (B.8)
B.2 Firms
Each firm employs nt workers, and produces output, yt, by means of the Cobb-
Douglas production function
yt = atk
α
t (ntht)
1−α. (B.9)
Firms decide the number of vacancies to open each period, vt. For each vacancy
open, firms pay a cost κ. Firms have the ability to transform final goods into
capital goods by means of a linear technology. Capital goods depreciate at a
rate δk per period. Let Jt denote the value of the representative firm. The firm’s
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objective is to choose a path for vt and for kt+1 that maximizes
Jt = max
vt,kt+1
(
atk
α
t (ntht)
1−α + (1− δk)kt − kt+1 − wtntht − vtκ+ Et [Λt+1Jt+1]
)
,
(B.10)
subject to
nt+1 = (1− δn)nt + q(θt)vt. (B.11)
Let Jn denote the marginal value of a worker to the firm. Then, the first-order
condition of the firm’s maximization problem with respect to vt can be expressed
as
Et [Λt+1Jn,t+1] q(θt) = κ, (B.12)
while the envelop condition for employment can be expressed as
Jn,t = (1− α)
yt
nt
− wtht + (1− δn)Et [Λt+1Jn,t+1] . (B.13)
Let Jk,t denote the marginal value of capital to the firm at time t. Then, the
first-order condition of the firm’s maximization problem with respect to kt+1 can
be expressed as
1 = Et [Λt+1Jk,t+1] , (B.14)
while the envelop condition for capital can be expressed as
Jk,t = α
yt
kt
+ 1− δk. (B.15)
We combine the last two equations by evaluating Eq. B.15 at t + 1 and substitut-
ing it into Eq. B.14:
1 = Et
[
Λt+1
(
α
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1− δk
)]
. (B.16)
B.3 Wages and Hours per worker
We assume that wages and hours per worker are determined at the start of each
period, and that they are the result of Nash bargaining between the worker and the
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firm:
wt = argmax
w,h
V˜n,t(w, h)
φJ˜n,t(w, h)
1−φ, (B.17)
where V˜n,t(w, h) is the marginal value to the household of having a worker em-
ployed at some wage w per h hours worked rather than unemployed; J˜n,t(w, h) is
the marginal value to the firm of employing an additional worker at some wage w
per h hours worked; and φ is the worker’s bargaining power.
Following the steps in Shimer (2012a), we find that wt and ht satisfy the equa-
tions:
φJn,t = wtht(1− φ)− γ
h1+ψt
1 + ψ
ct(1− φ)+
φ(1− δn − f(θt))Et [Λt+1Jn,t+1] , (B.18)
γh1+ψt = (1− α)
yt
ntct
. (B.19)
B.4 Equilibrium
To complete the model, we add the resource constraint
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + vtκ. (B.20)
B.5 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we use κ, σ, and γ to target steady-state employment,
hours per workers, and job filling probability. In particular, we target n = 0.94,
h = 1, and q = 0.7. We calibrate the remaining parameters following the real
business cycle literature and search and matching literature: β = 0.99, α = 0.36,
δk = 1.1
1/4−1, ψ = 1, η = 0.5, δn = 0.1, and φ = 0.5. The parameters regarding
the productivity shock are the same as for the main model of Chapter 3.
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